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The prototype approach has developed as an 
alternative to the classical approach to psychiatric 
diagnosis. This approach has been used to explain low 
reliability in diagnostic judgment. The research 
utilizing this approach has demonstrated that diagnostic 
judgment is affected by the number of attributes of a 
category exhibited by a patient. Specifically, patients 
who exhibit few category-congruent attributes are more 
likely to be misdiagnosed or considered atypical examples 
of a diagnostic category than are patients who exhibit 
many category-congruent attributes. However, the research 
has failed to control for attribute distinctiveness. In 
addition, attribute centrality offers an alternative 
explanation of the available research findings. 
The present study attempted to examine the effects of 
attribute centrality and attribute distinctiveness, using 
personality disorder diagnostic categories, while holding 
attribute number at a low, constant level. Experience 
clinical psychologists were presented with personality 
profiles containing attributes of Antisocial, Borderline, 
Histrionic, and Narcissistic personality disorders, and 
were asked to provide diagnoses. 
The profiles contained attributes which were either 
all distinctive to one category, all shared by more than 
one category, or were half distinctive and half shared. 
Within each of these conditions, the centrality of the 
attributes was either high or low. Main effects for both 
variables were hypothesized. 
The results indicated a strong main effect for 
attribute centrality. The effect of distinctiveness was 
also significant, as was the interaction between the two. 
The implications of the results for clinical 
diagnosis are discussed. It is concluded that the data 
support the concept of similarity matching as the primary 
process in diagnostic judgment. 
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When describing themselves or other people, humans 
frequently use category labels as summary statements about 
the person in question. For example, I may refer to 
myself as an "extravert," and my friend as a "liberal." 
Similarly, a psychiatric diagnostician may, after 
interviewing a patient, label that person a "neurotic" or 
"psychotic." "Casual observation as well as voluminous 
empirical research attest to the pervasive human tendency 
to categorize not just objects but also people into 
groups, types, or other slots" (Cantor & Mischel, 1979a, 
p. 4) . 
Categorization is one way in which we attempt to make 
our world more orderly. Essentially, the large number of 
environmental stimuli we are exposed to are organized 
into smaller groups to which we can respond effectively. 
We are thus able to "organize and make sense of the flood 
of 'stimuli' impinging from the environment" (Cantor & 
Mischel, 1979a, p. 4). 
Person categorization also seems to provide the user 
with a set of expectations about how the perceived is 
likely to behave in the future. If I am told that the 
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person I am about to meet is an "extravert," I may look 
for that person to greet me with a firm, vigorous 
handshake and words of greeting. The category label thus 
may provide us with both a description of that person and 
a feeling that we can predict what that person will do. 
Development of Cognitive Schemata 
When categorizing people, then, we observe the 
person's physical appearance and behavior. The 
categorization process, however, is not only a function of 
the attributes of the perceived. It is thought that this 
process also depends on the perceiver's pre-existing 
conceptions about people. That is, people develop person 
categories as a result of experiences which guide the 
categorization process. 
These abstract categories are thought to be 
comprised of cognitive structures or schemata which exist 
in the mind and provide the organizational framework for 
person perception and categorization. In general, a 
schema may be thought of as a cognitive structure which 
represents a scheme or a method for organizing information 
about the world. "Cognitive psychology has recently 
presented a good deal of evidence . . . that people 
learn and remember information by actively categorizing or 
coding the input according to well-learned conceptual 
schemata . . ." (Cantor & Mischel, 1977, p. 79). 
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The Prototype Approach 
Research has not conclusively determined the nature 
of the cognitive structures which guide the categorization 
process. Numerous theorists have proposed their own 
conceptions of the nature of these structures, however 
(e.g., Srull, Lichtenstein, and Rothbart, 1985). 
One alternative was elaborated by Rosch and Mervis 
(1975) and was used to explain the process by which we 
come to categorize objects. Called the prototype 
approach, this conception assumes that we store in memory 
the attributes associated with many different categories 
of objects. We thus, upon experiencing an object in the 
real world, compare attributes of the object with the 
prototypes activated by the object. A prototype is a 
normative conceptual schema. That is, it represents a way 
of defining a commonly shared belief system about a 
cognitive concept. Prototypicality is determined by rules 
relating the object's similarity to and distinctiveness 
from various prototypes. The object is thus processed 
more easily if it is determined to be highly prototypical. 
Cantor and Mischel (1979a) suggest that there may be 
similarities in the way people categorize objects and 
people. That is, the rules by which people are assigned 
to categories (e.g., trait labels, diagnoses) may be 
similar to the way in which objects are categorized. 
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Determining Prototypicality 
The prototypicality approach assumes that perceivers 
store in memory a cognitive representation of various 
categories used to describe people. These cognitive 
representations consist of abstract sets of features, 
correlated to varying degrees with category membership. 
What then are the rules by which perceivers judge others 
to represent prototypical categories into which people 
are placed? 
Cantor and Mischel (1979a) state that several 
factors may influence prototypicality judgments in the 
person domain: first, dominance (the number of category-
consistent attributes relative to the total number of 
attributes); and second, the presence of attributes that 
are not compatible with the type. Other variables which 
have been speculated about include attribute intensity 
(Cantor & Mischel, 1979b), concrete versus abstract 
categories (Cantor, Mischel, & Schwartz, 1982), and 
feature overlap with closely related categories (Horowitz 
et al. , 1981b). Intensity is not defined by Cantor and 
Mischel, either in the abstract of Cantor's (1978) 
dissertation, or in Cantor and Mischel (1979b). Concrete 
vs. abstract person or situation types was discussed with 
reference to the ease with which such types could be 
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imaged. The terms were not further defined, except to 
speculate that concrete person types might be more easily 
imaged than abstract situation types. 
Cantor and Mischel (1979a) state that one of the 
most important variables in the information about a 
person concerns the breadth of their behavior which is 
congruent with category membership. Breadth refers to the 
number of attributes associated with a particular type 
category which a person exhibits. A person demonstrates 
increasing breadth by exhibiting an increasing number of 
category-consistent attributes. The greater the number of 
category-congruent features one exhibits the more 
prototypical he or she appears, and the easier it is for 
the perceiver to process the incoming information about 
him or her. Research on prototypicality has examined this 
variable most closely, usually by presenting subjects 
person information that varies in the number of 
category-congruent features. Ease of processing the 
information based on this variable has been examined, and 
effects have been noted both in recognition memory (Cantor 
& Mischel, 1977) and in recall memory (Cantor & Mischel, 
1979b). However, recently Richter and Seay (1987) have 
suggested that the strength of the effects may be due to 
regarding stimuli as a fixed effect in the ANOVA model. 
In addition, examination of the structure of person 
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categories at different levels of a person taxonomy has 
been attempted (Cantor & Mischel, 1979a), revealing 
advantages to examining middle-level instead of 
superordinate or subordinate categories. 
In her doctoral dissertation, Cantor (1978) 
investigated the rules that determine one's perception of 
a person as prototypical. She proposed that, when one has 
extensive information about an individual, three factors 
influence the perception: breadth of category-consistent 
features the person exhibits; the extent to which these 
features dominate the person's personality; and the extent 
to which the person's behavior is different from a polar 
opposite category. In one experiment, subjects wrote 
detailed descriptions of friends they considered "good," 
"moderate," and "poor" examples of extraverts. Another 
group judged the prototypicality of the descriptions. In 
addition, composite scores for the three factors above 
were derived for each description. It was found that the 
judges reliably rated the prototypicality of the 
descriptions; further, prototypicality was highly 
correlated with the composite score. 
Cantor noted that prototypicality judgments are 
often made under conditions of "restricted view" (i.e., 
following only brief exposure to a person), and suggested 
that the rules determining prototypicality under these 
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conditions may be different from the rules that determine 
prototypicality under "full view" conditions (that is, 
when one knows a person well). Specifically, she stated 
that, under "restricted view", prototypicality would be a 
function of the degree to which the person exhibited the 
most central category features, consistently and intensely 
across many situations, particularly where such behavior 
is non-normative. These results were obtained in three 
experiments using different paradigms. Consistent 
characters were judged more prototypical if their behavior 
was exhibited in non-normative situations. Inconsistent 
characters were judged more prototypical if their behavior 
was consistent in normative situations. 
The prototype approach has also been extended to 
describe how people perceive and categorize situations, as 
opposed to people (Cantor, Mischel, & Schwartz, 1982; 
Schutte, Kenrick, & Sadalla, 1985). Findings indicate 
similar internal structure of prototypes and similar 
effects on recognition memory. 
Research on Prototypicality and Diagnosis 
The prototype approach has also been applied to 
clinical psychology and psychiatry, specifically to the 
process by which diagnosticians categorize patients. 
Cantor, Smith, French, and Mezzich (1980) provided the 
first investigations in this area. The authors first 
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de s c r i b e d  t h e  c l a s s i c a l  v i e w  o f  p s y c h i a t r i c  
categorization, in which categories are comprised of a 
small number of individually necessary and jointly 
sufficient features. They contrasted this with the 
prototype approach, in which category features are 
correlated with category membership, but are not 
considered necessary. They atte-mpted to demonstrate that 
psychiatric categories more closely fit the prototype than 
the classical view. Thirteen clinicians listed the 
features they believed characterized the prototypical 
patient for nine diagnostic categories. The 13 features 
lists were then reduced to a consensual prototype for each 
category by listing category features mentioned by three 
or more subjects. Inspection of the consensual prototypes 
revealed that few features were mentioned by most of the 
clinicians. Most features were mentioned by two to four 
subjects. Further, the features in the consensual 
prototypes did not overlap completely with the features 
listed for those categories in DSM-II (American 
Psychiatric Association, 1968), the standard diagnostic 
manual used by clinicians at that time. 
The authors also examined the effects of case history 
prototypicality on clinicians' diagnoses and typicality 
ratings. Prototypicality was defined by the number of 
category features in the case history. The authors found 
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that the atypical cases (i.e., those with only four 
features of a category) were diagnosed less accurately and 
confidently than cases of medium (five to eight features) 
or high (eight to thirteen features) prototypicality. Low 
accuracy of diagnosis of the atypical cases had been 
expected, due to the low degree of overlap between the 
case history information and the prototype for those 
categories. The authors argued, as a result, that 
"imperfect inter- and intra-judge reliability can all be 
accepted and studied as fundamental properties of the 
system, rather than branded as aberrations, errors in 
measurement or faulty utilization of an otherwise 
classical scientific system" (Cantor et al. , 1980, p. 
190) . 
Blashfield and Sprock (unpublished manuscript, 1983) 
attempted a partial replication of the Cantor et al. 
(1980) study. Regarding subjects' diagnostic accuracy and 
typicality and confidence ratings, the authors reported 
that only two of the eight categories- "manic-depressive, 
manic" and "paranoid schizophrenia"- were diagnosed with 
high accuracy. However, Cantor et al. (1980) conducted 
their study while DSM-II was the current diagnostic 
system. Then DSM-III was introduced, with major revisions 
in the categories used in the Cantor et al. study. The 
introduction of DSM-III probably contaminates the findings 
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of the Blashfield and Sprock study. To replicate, even 
partially, Cantor et al.'s (1980) findings would require 
finding clinicians who have not been influenced by 
DSM-III. a difficult task indeed. 
However, Genero and Cantor (in press), claim to have 
replicated the Cantor et al . (1980) research. In 
addition, they examined the relative merits of using a 
summary prototype approach or an exemplar approach (Smith 
& Medin, 1981). They concluded that the summary prototype 
a p p r o a c h  w a s  b e s t  f o r  t r a i n i n g  i n e x p e r i e n c e d  
diagnosticians, while the exemplar approach was more 
appropriate for experienced clinicians. 
The prototype approach has also been extended to the 
study of depression (Horowitz, Post, French, Wallis, & 
Siegelman, 1981; Horowitz, Wright, Lowenstein, & Parad, 
1981). Horowitz, Wright, Lowenstein, and Parad (1981) 
described a method for generating prototypes, and compared 
the prototypes developed by experts to those generated by 
less experienced people. In Horowitz Post, French, 
Wallis, and Siegelman (1981), the authors generated a 
prototype for a depressed person by asking 35 students in 
an introductory psychology class to think of the best 
example they could of someone who was depressed, and to 
describe that person's most usual feelings, thought, and 
behavior. After generating the prototype, the authors 
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re-examined the 35 essays and selected six essays, varying 
in the number of features present (low, 1 feature; medium, 
4-9 features; and high, 17-20 features). These essays 
were presented to 24 other students, who were asked to 
rate the person (on a 5-point scale) in the essay along 
several dimensions, including depression. Subjects were 
also asked to select five adjectives from a list of 24 to 
best describe the person (depression was one of the 
adjectives). The results were that ratings of depression 
varied directly with prototypicality. In addition, the 
probability that the adjective depression was selected 
varied directly with prototypicality as well. The authors 
argued that degree of resemblance (defined by feature 
number) "defines a continuum that raters, at least, seem 
to use in judging the trait" (p. 578). 
Horowitz, Post, French, Wallis, and Siegelman (1981) 
also examined disagreement among judges regarding a 
patient's depression as a function of prototypicality, 
again determined by the number of depressed features the 
patient exhibited. Twenty-four clinicians noted the 
depression of 12 patients viewed on videotape. Patients 
differed in self-reported depression, with depression 
highly salient in one group, less salient in another, and 
still less in a third group. Salience referred to the 
extent to which patients regarded depression as a symptom 
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when Initially interviewed. Those in one group mentioned 
depression as a major symptom. Their depression therefore 
was considered highly salient. Those in a second group 
mentioned depression, but only as a secondary symptom; 
other presenting problems had led them to seek therapy. 
Those in a third group had not mentioned depression at 
all. Their depression was considered less salient. The 
judges were asked to identify patient characteristics 
(including features of depression) in the patients, and to 
rate them along various dimensions, including depression. 
Results indicated that the number of features of 
depression varied directly and significantly with salience 
of depression. Further, inter judge agreement regarding 
depression was higher, and patients were rated more 
depressed, the more features of depression they exhibited. 
The authors suggested that, while highly prototypical 
cases activate judges' prototypes, less highly 
prototypical cases may activate some judge's prototypes, 
but not others. 
Horowitz, Post, French, Wallis, and Siegelman (1981) 
also asked whether judge's disagreement is more a function 
of few prototypical features being present or, instead, by 
many irrelevant features being present. They presented 26 
cases to 20 clinicians and asked them to assign all the 
diagnoses they thought might reasonably apply to the case. 
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They then selected 24 cases with varying degrees of 
consensus of diagnosis (high, medium, and low). Cases 
with high diagnostic consensus had received a particular 
diagnosis by 80% to 100% of the clinicians. Medium 
consensus cases had received the same diagnosis by 30% to 
50% of the clinicians. None of the clinicians (0%) had 
assigned the diagnosis to the low consensus cases. These 
24 cases were evaluated by 20 subjects (each subject 
evaluated 12 cases for the presence of features of eight 
diagnostic categories). The authors found that degree of 
consensus in diagnoses varied with the number of relevant 
features present (the more relevant features, the higher 
the consensus), but not with the number of irrelevant 
features present. 
Horowitz, French, and Anderson (1982) used the 
prototype approach to study the "lonely" person. The 
authors attempted to describe the prototype of a lonely 
person, and to examine the effects of prototypicality of 
person information on judgments of loneliness. Forty 
introductory psychology students were asked to think of 
the best example they could of a person they knew was 
lonely, and to write down that person's most usual 
thoughts, feelings, and behavior. Three judges then 
reduced the lists to a consensual prototype by selecting 
features supplied by 20% or more of the subjects (i.e., 
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eight or more subjects). The authors do not state why the 
20% criterion for feature inclusion was chosen. The final 
consensual prototype of the "lonely person" contained 18 
features. Essays were then selected which contained one 
or two prototypic features (low prototypicality), five or 
six (medium), or nine or ten (high prototypicality) 
features. Thirty-nine subjects then rated three essays 
along various dimensions (including lonely) to describe 
the people about whom they read. It was found that essays 
were judged as describing people as lonelier, the greater 
the number of lonely features present. 
Much of the research on prototypes and diagnosis has 
focused on examining the cognitive processes involved in 
choice of diagnosis and typicality of the choice made. 
Other research in prototypes and diagnosis have focused on 
the attempt to find prototypical exemplars in the 
psychiatric literature (Blashfield, Sprock, Pinkston, & 
Hodgin, 1985), effects on making a diagnosis on 
recognition memory (Arkes & Harkness, 1980), and an 
examination of the attributes exhibited by patients 
presumably correctly diagnosed with a particular disorder 
(Clarkin, Widiger, Frances, Hurt, & Gilmore, 1983). 
Horowitz and Vitkus (1986) have recently extended the 
discussion of prototypes and diagnosis to include 
conceptualizing disorders along the lines of interpersonal 
problems rather than psychiatric symptoms. The authors 
refer to the previous research by Horowitz, French, and 
Anderson (1982) regarding the prototype of the lonely 
person. It was observed that many of the elements of 
loneliness were related directly to interpersonal problems 
(such as socializing). An instrument designed to measure 
interpersonal problems was administered to a large group 
of very lonely persons and a large group of not lonely 
persons. Twelve elements related to socializing were 
included in the instrument. The lonely people, it was 
found, evidenced a higher level of distress on each of the 
12 items than the not lonely people. The authors state 
that the findings suggest that the prototypic 
interpersonal elements of loneliness identified in the 
previous research appear to provide valid conceptual 
elements of loneliness. 
Prototypicality Research Re-examined 
The available research in the clinical area seems to 
provide support for the appropriateness of applying the 
prototype model to understand clinical diagnosis. Studies 
of diagnosticians (Cantor et al., 1980; Horowitz et al., 
1981b) suggest that clinical judgment is guided at least 
in part by an interaction between the structure of 
knowledge about diagnostic categories in the head of the 
diagnostician, and the nature of the input information 
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about the person to be diagnosed. The research suggests 
that variation in diagnostic accuracy and typicality 
ratings is a function of variation in the number of 
category-congruent features the person exhibits. 
However, an examination of Rosch's formula for 
determining prototypicality in the object domain (Rosch, 
1978), as well as a re-examination of the Cantor et al. 
(1980) study, may make the above conclusion premature. 
Rosch states that prototypes develop through maximization 
of cue validity. Cue validity is probabilistic. The cue 
validity of a feature in predicting a certain category 
increases with an increase in the frequency with which the 
cue is associated with that category. Featural cue 
validity goes down as does the frequency with which the 
cue is associated with other categories. It follows that 
the prototypicality of an instance to a category goes up 
as the total cue validity (summed across features) goes up 
and decreases as the total cue validity of the information 
does down. 
As Cantor and Genero (1986) point out, diagnosis is 
in part a matter of determining what an instance is an 
example of. Moreover, in determining how typical an 
instance is of a category chosen, it appears that the 
clinician uses a similarity (between instance and 
category)-matching procedure. 
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In Cantor et al. (1980), however, subjects were 
asked to choose a category of psychopathology, based on 
the information in a case history, from a list of possible 
choices. In other words, the subjects were being asked 
not only to decide what the person in the case history 
was, but also what the person wasn11. This type of 
judgment requires consideration not only of the features 
that are common to a category being considered, but also 
to features that are associated with other categories as 
well. This consideration is consistent with Rosch's 
formulation of cue validity. 
A re-examination of the findings of Cantor et al. 
(1980) reveals a problem associated with their conclusion 
that feature number was responsible for the variance in 
clinicians' judgments of prototypicality. The authors, in 
fact, discuss the problem of featural overlap in their 
findings. However, they do so only to explain results 
that are not consistent with their original hypotheses. 
The same argument may be used to apply to findings that 
are consistent with their hypotheses. For example, the 
case history of the manic-depressive, manic with a high 
number of category-congruent features was diagnosed 
correctly by 100* of subjects, with an average typicality 
rating of 5.4 on a scale of one to seven (with one 
representing the lowest level of typicality and seven, 
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the highest). However, the high level of accuracy may not 
have been due to high feature number, but to low feature 
overlap. That is, the particular features in the case 
history may have been distinctive to that category. Along 
the same lines, the authors report that the case history 
of the manic-depressive, depressed with a low number of 
features was diagnosed accurately by only 33% of subjects, 
with' a mean typicality rating of 1.8. But it may have 
been that the features in the case history for this 
category were also features of other categories (e.g. , 
paranoid or chronic undifferentiated schizophrenia, which 
were the categories chosen by 67* of subjects). 
One basic problem with Cantor et al. (1980), then, 
was the failure to control for overlapping features. The 
present study was designed to address this problem. A 
second problem with Cantor et al. (1980) concerns their 
conclusion that feature number was responsible for 
variability in diagnostic accuracy. An alternative view 
is that feature centrality, discussed in the following 
section, may have accounted in part for the results. 
Feature Centrality 
The results of the Clarkin et al. (1983) study 
suggest an intriguing possibility regarding the cognitive 
processes by which clinicians assign patients to 
diagnostic categories. It is possible that the features 
of a clinician's prototype for a diagnostic category are 
subjectively or implicitly weighted as well, i.e., that 
the presence of particular features, rather than the 
presence of many features, leads the clinician to 
determine that the patient is appropriately diagnosed in a 
certain way. 
The findings in personality and clinical psychology 
strengthen the argument that person perception and 
categorization involve an interaction between the 
features exhibited by the person who is perceived and the 
perceiver's structured belief system about the make-up of 
various personality types. 
An alternative explanation of the findings in the 
studies summarized above, however, suggests that a 
variable other than, or in addition to, feature number may 
be operating to produce person information which is 
prototypical of a personality type category. It has been 
shown that the probability that the person perceived will 
be judged to be a member of a category increases as the 
number of features that person exhibits increases. 
However, this result may be more related to the 
correlation between the features and the category than to 
the number of features per se. That is, as the number of 
features present increases, so does the probability that 
features highly correlated with the category will be 
20 
present. Thus, it would seem that in some cases, 
information containing a smaller number of features might 
be considered more prototypical than that containing a 
larger number of features if those few features are the 
most central to the definition of the category; that is, 
those few features may have the highest correlations with 
category membership. A person described in this way may be 
considered more typical of a category than a person who is 
described by more category features, if, in the latter 
case, the features are the most peripheral to the 
category (i.e., have the lowest correlations with 
category membership) . The findings of the studies 
summarized above may have resulted from the particular 
configuration of features in the information presented, 
rather than the number of features present. 
In addition to feature number and category overlap, 
then, another variable which may affect diagnostic 
judgment concerns the extent to which a feature is 
correlated with category membership. The prototype 
approach assumes that categories consist of an abstract 
set of features, each correlated to a certain degree with 
category membership. However, there may be great 
variability in feature correlation with a category. It 
seems reasonable to propose that a person will be judged 
more prototypical if the person exhibits the features 
highly correlated with the category than if they exhibit 
lower correlated features. 
Support for this idea comes from the literature on 
the prototype approach. Cantor and Mischel (1979a), for 
example, differentiate between observations made when much 
information is available about the person (called "full" 
view) and when only limited information is available 
(called "restricted" view). Under restricted viewing 
conditions, prototypicality is proposed by Cantor and 
Mischel (1979c) to be affected by the extent to which the 
person exhibits the most central (highly associated) 
category attributes consistently and intensely across many 
situations, particularly in situations in which the 
behavior is not routinely observed. 
Other researchers suggest the importance of examining 
feature centrality as well. Cantor and Mischel (1979b) 
suggest its importance for study in their research on the 
effects of prototypical information on recall. Other 
prototypicality research (Clarkin et al. , 1983) indicates 
that certain features are more closely associated with 
category inclusion. 
Why examine the effects of feature centrality on 
judgments of prototypicality? One answer to this question 
relates to the issue of the prototype approach to 
classification in relation to the traditional classical 
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approach. As Cantor et al . (1980) point out, the 
classical approach assumes that "a category is defined by 
a small set of simply necessary and jointly sufficient 
features" (p. 182). This means that all category 
features are associated 100% with category membership. The 
prototype view, however, assumes that features are 
correlated with category membership, but not perfectly. 
Categories are conceived of as "fuzzy sets," with 
heterogeneous membership. A fuzzy set simply refers to 
the fact that the features are not necessary and 
sufficient; rather, they are found to be present in some 
category members, but not necessarily in all. 
Feature centrality is in a sense a recognition of 
both views. It recognizes that a feature may approach 
necessity in order for the entity (be it object or person) 
to be considered a member. Cantor et al. (1980) in fact 
suggest the existence of necessary features (e.g., 
feathered and winged) when discussing the features of the 
category "bird." Another example, from Carkin et al. 
(1983), concerns the features of BPD. "There is some 
theoretical base on which to expect differential 
efficiency for the eight BPD features. Although identity 
disturbance is not an essential criterion in DSM-III. 
high efficiency for this item might be expected because of 
its necessary presence in Kernberg's (1931) classical 
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category of "Borderline Personality Organization" (pp. 
264-265). It appears, then, that those who write on the 
prototype approach recognize that all features of a 
prototype are not "created equal." Feature centrality is 
also a variable of potential theoretical import to the 
area of categorization generally. Rosch's (1978) 
formulation of cue validity relies on measuring the 
frequency with which subjects state that a feature is a 
member of a category. The more frequently the feature is 
regarded as being associated with the category, the 
higher is its cue validity. However, frequency as a 
measure tells us nothing about the degree to which a 
feature is thought to be associated with category 
membership. Moreover, the concept of feature centrality 
takes frequency into account, because it provides a 
measure of the frequency with which subjects associate a 
feature with a category, and an average of the degree to 
which those subjects thought that the feature and the 
category were associated. In other words, feature 
centrality loses none of the meaning captured by the 
frequency measure, and appears to be more precise than 




The research on prototypicality, then, suggests that 
persons are perceived as more prototypical of a category 
if they possess more features correlated with that 
category than if they possess few features. However, it 
is not clear that the number of correlated features 
present in information about a person is the only 
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variable affecting judgments of prototypicality. Feature 
centrality may also affect decisions about how 
prototypical persons are of certain categories (Cantor, 
1978) . 
Feature centrality, however, has not been examined in 
the context of psychodiagnosis. In Cantor (1978) and 
Cantor and Mischel (1979c), undergraduates judged the 
prototypicality of information about people varying in 
extraversion and intelligence. Schutte, Kenrick, and 
Sadalla (1985) varied the centrality of situation (not 
person) prototypes. In Clarkin et al. (1983), the 
feature centrality of BPD patients was examined subsequent 
to diagnoses, and only DSM-III features were examined. 
The present research examined the prototypicality 
judgments made by experienced clinical diagnosticians in 
the context of making diagnostic judgments based on 
information about people. The study attempted to overcome 
the limitation of previous research in the clinical area 
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by taking feature overlap into account explicitly. Case 
history information was manipulated so that feature 
overlap between categories was either low or high. 
Of primary importance in the study was the effect of 
feature centrality and feature overlap on judgments of 
prototypicality. Will information about a person which 
contains the most central congruent features be regarded 
as more prototypical than if the information contains 
congruent features most peripheral to the category? Will 
case histories containing distinctive features be 
categorized more accurately than case histories containing 
features that are common to more than one category? How 
do feature centrality and feature overlap interact? The 
behavior of clinicians in applying diagnoses to case 
history was examined to answer these questions. Cases 
were developed so as to vary in the presence of central 
or peripheral features. Cases also varied in the degree 
of featural overlap. Prototypicality judgments were 
measured by calculating the accuracy of diagnoses, by 
comparing the diagnosis the clinician made to the 
diagnosis intended. The subjects's report of how well the 
case fits the diagnosis (i.e., a typicality rating) was 
also studied. This score was combined with the accuracy 
score to form a composite accuracy-typicality score. It 
was hypothesized that subjects would assign higher 
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accuracy-typicality scores to cases with more highly 
central attributes than to those with more highly 
peripheral ones. 
In addition, the effect of feature overlap on 
pr o t o typi cal i ty judgments was examined. It was 
hypothesized that cases with fewer overlapping features 
would be diagnosed with greater accuracy and with higher 
typicality than cases containing more features that are 
shared by more than one category. The research also 
examined the interaction of feature centrality and feature 
overlap on diagnostic agreement and typicality. It was 
hypothesized that case histories containing highly central 
and distinctive features would be judged as most 
prototypical (i.e., would yield the highest accuracy-
typicality scores); conversely, case histories containing 
features with low category association which also overlap 
other categories would be judged least prototypical (i.e., 
would yield the lowest accuracy-typicality scores). 
Predictions regarding the interaction of feature 
centrality and feature overlap were more problematic. 
Predictions regarding all cases depend on the cue validity 
of the case history for the categories being considered. 
The relative contribution of the two variables is not 
known; therefore, hypothesized interactions depend in part 





20 subjects were randomly selected from a population 
of permanently licensed clinical psychologists practicing 
within a 50-mile radius of Greensboro, North Carolina. 
The population was derived from a list compiled by the 
North Carolina State Board of Examiners of Practicing 
Psychologists. Subjects were solicited through the mail. 
The solicitation requested the participation of 
psychologists who had been licensed for at least three 
years, and whose area of expertise included diagnosing 
personality disorders (see Appendix A for the solicitation 
letter). Approximately 130 solicitation letters were 
mailed. Of these, about 65 resulted in responses from 
psychologists. Approximately 40 psychologists agreed to 
participate. Eight respondents were eliminated because 
they stated that they did not perform diagnostic duties or 
failed to meet the experience requirements. Stimulus 
materials were sent to 32 subjects, and valid responses 
were received from 20 subjects. 
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Stimulus Materials 
The stimulus materials used in the experiment 
consisted of a page of instructions, 32 personality 
profiles constructed according to certain specifications, 
and an attribute listing sheet; an introductory letter 
accompanied these materials (see Appendix B for a complete 
set of the materials sent to subjects) . Each profile 
contained six attributes, chosen from a list of attributes 
of one of four personality disorder categories. The four 
categories were Antisocial, Borderline, Histrionic, and 
Narcissistic Personality Disorders. These particular 
categories were chosen because Livesley's (1986) research 
indicated that they were the four personality disorders 
showing the largest percentage of overlapping attributes. 
A large pool of overlapping attributes was considered 
necessary, from a technical standpoint, in order to 
construct profiles containing all shared attributes, while 
at the same time satisfying the requirement that the 
independent variables be orthogonal. Theoretically, it 
was assumed that misdiagnoses often occur between and 
among closely related categories; thus, selecting these 
four categories would presumably allow for the strongest 
test of the experimental hypotheses. 
Below each profile was a space in which the subject 
indicated which diagnostic categories fit the profile 
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best, and how well they fit the categories. The four 
categories used in the study were listed first, in 
alphabetical order. Two "Other" categories were provided 
for the subject to list diagnoses other than the four 
above. Beside each category was a scale from one to 
seven, for the subject to indicate how well their choice 
fit the category they had chosen (with seven indicating 
the best fit, and one the worst). 
The attribute ranking page asked the subject to 
answer some questions about the final profile. On the 
sheet, subjects were asked to refer back to the profile, 
and list the attributes which were important to them in 
arriving at their first-choice diagnosis. Six blank lines 
followed these instructions. Beside each line was a scale 
from one to five on which the subject could indicate how 
important the attribute was in their decision. 
Constructing Personality Profiles. 
The lists of attributes for the four categories were 
obtained from Dr. John Livesley, a researcher at the 
University of Calgary in Alberta, Canada. Livesley had 
reviewed the major literature on personality disorders and 
had extracted from the literature the attributes 
considered to be characteristic of each category. He then 
obtained ratings (on a 7-point scale) from psychiatrists 
regarding how characteristic of a category they felt each 
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attribute was. In addition, he and his colleagues 
analyzed the lists of attributes and determined which 
attributes were distinctive to a single category and which 
were shared by more than one category. 
The attribute lists developed by Livesley for the 
personality disorders were ordered according to how 
characteristic each attribute was perceived to be of the 
category (with the most characteristic attribute listed 
first). Livesley provided the first quartile 
(representing the most characteristic attributes) and the 
fourth quartile (representing the least characteristic 
attributes) attributes for the four categories of 
interest. 
The first task was to select twelve attributes (the 
six most and the six least characteristic distinctive and 
shared attributes) from each of the four lists, to use in 
the profiles. To meet the requirement that the 
independent variables be orthogonal, it was important that 
the total centrality (how characteristic the attributes 
were of the category) of the distinctive and the shared 
attributes chosen from each quartile be roughly 
equivalent. Initial examination of the lists revealed 
that distinctive and shared attributes were not randomly 
situated in the lists. Therefore, simply selecting the 
top (or bottom) six distinctive and six shared attributes 
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would not result in orthogonal independent variables. 
Consequently, adjustments were made in attribute selection 
which maximized centrality but met the requirement of 
orthogonality. 
After all the attributes had been selected, they were 
used to construct the personality profiles. Six 
attributes were included in each profile, according to the 
requirements of the independent variables. The attributes 
were randomly ordered to control for sequence effects. In 
those conditions which included 50* shared and 50% 
distinctive attributes, shared and distinctive attributes 
were selected so as to assure orthogonality within that 
condition as well as between that condition and all other 
relevant conditions (see Appendix C for statistics 
concerning the average prototypicality of attributes 
selected so as to meet the requirement of orthogonality). 
Each attribute was included in a sentence which 
stated that a hypothetical person exhibited that 
attribute. The person's gender was purposely concealed in 
order to control this potentially influential variable. 
Procedure 
Stimulus materials prepared for each subject 
consisted of 16 personality profiles, reflecting four 
conditions for each of the four personality disorder 
categories. The 16 profiles were randomly ordered to 
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control for sequence effects. An attribute listing form 
followed the final profile. 
Instructions preceding the first profile asked the 
subject to consider each of the profiles in turn. 
Beginning with the first profile, the subject was asked to 
consider a person who was described in the profile. The 
subject was then asked to provide a diagnosis which they 
felt best fit the person. The subject was also asked to 
provide a typicality rating for the category they had 
chosen. Subjects were also asked to provide a 
second-choice diagnosis and typicality rating. Subjects 
were asked to perform these tasks for each profile. 
Following the final profile, they were asked to list the 
attributes they considered important for their 
first-choice diagnosis, in order of importance, and 
indicate how important each attribute they listed was. 
Experimental Design 
The overall design of the study consisted of two 
independent within-subjects designs. Ten subjects were 
randomly assigned to each. In the first design, subjects 
received 16 personality profiles to diagnose. These were 
defined by crossing four diagnostic categories with two 
levels of distinctiveness (either all distinctive or all 
shared) with two levels of centrality (either all high 
centrality or all low centrality) . The profiles in this 
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part of the design contained attributes all of which were 
either distinctive to the category from which they were 
taken, or were shared by more than one category. The 
attributes, whether all distinctive or all shared, were 
either all of high centrality to the category from which 
they were chosen, or were all peripheral to that category. 
This was referred to as the 100% or 0% Distinctive 
Attributes design. 
In the second design, subjects also received 16 
profiles, defined by a 4 (categories) x 2 (levels of 
centrality of the distinctive attributes, either high or 
low) x 2 (levels of centrality of the shared attributes, 
either high or low) . The percentage of attributes which 
were distinctive was kept constant at 50%. The other 50% 
of the attributes were shared with at least one other 
category. Within this 50/50 mix of distinctive and shared 
attributes, the centrality of the distinctive and of the 
shared attributes was completely crossed. This created 
four conditions: in one, both the distinctive and the 
shared attributes were highly central to the category from 
which they were chosen; in one, both the distinctive and 
the shared attributes were of low centrality; in one, the 
distinctive attributes were of high centrality, but the 
shared attributes were of low centrality; and in one, the 
shared attributes were of high centrality and the 
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distinctive ones were of low centrality. This was 
referred to as the 50$ Distinctive Attributes design. 
Independent Variables 
Three independent variables, all pertaining to the 
information in the personality profiles, were manipulated. 
The first variable was diagnostic category. Profiles were 
constructed by selecting attributes from lists 
representing each of four categories of personality 
disorder. The four categories were Antisocial, 
Borderline, Histrionic, and Narcissistic Personality 
Disorders. 
The second independent variable was attribute 
centrality. The lists from which the attributes were 
drawn were ordered according to how characteristic each 
attribute was perceived to be of the category. Attributes 
were chosen from the first quartile (representing the most 
characteristic attributes) and the fourth quartile 
(representing the least characteristic attributes). 
The third independent variable was attribute 
distinctiveness.. The lists from which the attributes were 
chosen included a notation beside each attribute to 
indicate whether it was considered to be distinctive to 
that category or shared with at least one other category. 
An equal number of distinctive and shared attributes were 
chosen. 
Dependent Variables 
Subjects were asked to provide both first and second 
choice diagnoses and typicality ratings for each profile 
presented to them. The major dependent variable was a 
score which combined the accuracy of each choice and the 
typicality rating accompanying that choice. The score was 
derived by taking the typicality rating and assigning a 
positive value to it if the diagnosis was accurate. If 
the diagnosis was inaccurate, the typicality rating was 
assigned a negative value. In addition to the 
accuracy/typicality score, the accuracy of the diagnosis 






Subjects were 20 Licensed Practicing Psychologists, 
within a 50-mile radius of Greensboro, who have been 
permanently licensed at least three years. Their current 
self-reported professional expertise included diagnosing 
personality disorders. Table 1 provides demographic data 
on subjects. As can be seen in the table, 70$ were male. 
The mean age of subjects was 43 years. The majority, 639s, 
were in private practice. Subjects reported an average 
of 12 years' experience in diagnosing personality 
disorders. On the average, subjects had assessed 26 cases 
for the presence of personality disorder in the past six 
months. 
Overview of Dependent Variables and Analyses 
The dependent variable was a score which reflected 
both the accuracy of diagnosis and the typicality rating 
associated with the diagnosis chosen. The score was the 
typicality rating with a positive value if the diagnosis 
was accurate and a negative value if the diagnosis was 
inaccurate. 
Table 1 
Demographic Data on All 20 Subjects 
Variable Value 
Sex 30% Female 
(n = 20) 70% Male 
Age X = 43.4 years 
(n = 19) SD = 9.7 years 
Where 63% 
Practice 11% 





Mental Health Clinic 
Correctional Facility 
Medical School 
Years X = 11.8 years 
Experience SD = 6.7 years 




Last 6 Months 
(n = 19) 
X = 25.5 Cases 
SD = 32.6 Cases 
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Preliminary analysis of the data revealed that the 
data were not normally distributed. Therefore, parametric 
statistics were deemed inappropriate. Instead, 
Kruskal-Wallis Analyses of Variance of Ranked Data were 
performed. In order for these analyses to be performed, 
ranks for the four conditions for each subject were 
obtained by summing the accuracy/typicality ratings 
across the four diagnostic categories for each of the 
four conditions, and comparing the values for the 
conditions. All statistical analyses in this section 
refer to analyses of ranks. 
Three separate statistical analyses were conducted on 
the ranked data for first-choice diagnoses. First, a 
separate analysis of the 100% or 0% Distinctive Attributes 
design was conducted. This analysis allowed for an 
examination of the main effects of attribute centrality 
and attribute distinctiveness, as well as their 
interaction. The results of the statistical analysis will 
be presented. Tukey post-hocs and utility indices will 
also be presented. The accuracy/typicality scores for the 
four conditions, and the accuracy scores alone, will also 
be presented. 
Second, a separate analysis of the 50% Distinctive 
Attributes design was conducted. This analysis allowed an 
examination of the relative importance of the centrality 
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of distinctive attributes versus the centrality of shared 
attributes. Results will be presented as in the analysis 
above. 
Third, an analysis which combined both designs was 
conducted. This analysis, as with the second analysis, 
allowed an examination of the importance of the centrality 
of distinctive versus shared attributes. In addition to 
the results presented in this analysis, pairwise 
comparisons of all conditions in the study will be 
presented. This presentation will demonstrate the 
predictive ability of the independent variables. 
In addition to these analyses, descriptive analyses 
of inaccurate diagnoses will be presented. Descriptive 
analyses of second-choice data will follow. Finally, a 
descriptive analysis of the attribute listing data will be 
presented. 
First-Choice Diagnostic Data for 100% or 0% Distinctive 
Attributes Group 
The Interaction Between Attribute Centrality and 
Attribute Distinctiveness. One-hundred sixty first-
choice diagnoses were made (ten subjects times 16 cases 
per subject). Of the 160 diagnoses, 101 or 63% were 
accurate. Because the effects of attribute centrality and 
attribute distinctiveness are of primary importance, 
analysis of the effects of attribute centrality and 
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distinctiveness involved summing across diagnostic 
category within each condition (see Tables 2 and 3 for the 
accuracy percentages for each diagnostic category for each 
condition). 
Forty first-choice diagnoses and typicality ratings 
were made within each of the four conditions which 
reflect the complete crossing of attribute centrality 
(high or low) and attribute distinctiveness (100% shared 
or 100% distinctive attributes). 
The results of the Kruskal-Wal 1 is analysis of 
variance in the ranking of the four conditions is 
presented in Table 4. The analysis revealed the 
significant centrality by distinctiveness interaction, 
F(l,9) = 5.06, p < .05. Utility index indicated that the 
interaction accounted for 1% of the variance in the 
dependent variable. 
Tukey post-hoc comparisons among means revealed that 
for the 0% Distinctive, Peripheral condition the accuracy/ 
typicality value was significantly lower than any of the 
other three conditions. In addition, for the 100% 
Distinctive, Central condition the accuracy/typicality 
value was significantly higher than the 100% Distinctive, 
Peripheral condition. 
These diagnosis/typicality rating scores were summed 
across subjects and diagnostic categories to examine the 
Table 2 
First-Choice Data for Subjects Receiving Profiles 
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Table 4 
Kruskal-Wallis Analysis of Ranks for 10085 or 0515 
Distinctive Attributes Group: 
First-Choice Diagnosis 
Source df SS MS F P 
Distinct 1 10.0 10.0 16.36 .0029 
Error(Distinct) 9 5.5 0.6 
Central 1 28.9 28.9 123.86 .0001 
Error(Central) 9 2.1 0.2 
Distinct X Central 1 0.9 0.9 5.06 .0510 
Error(Distinct X 
Central) 0 1.6 0.2 
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effects of attribute centrality and attribute 
distinctiveness on accuracy/typicality of diagnosis. The 
results are presented in Figure 1. The highest score, 
+ 5.9, was obtained under the 100% Distinctive, High 
Centrality condition. This score indicates that, on 
average, subjects diagnosed cases in this condition 
correctly, and thought that the cases were good examples 
of the category. The lowest score, -4.6, was obtained 
under the 100% Shared, Low Centrality condition. A score 
of +4.6 was obtained in the 100% Shared, High Centrality 
condition. In the 100% Distinctive, Low Centrality 
condition, a score of +1.1 was obtained. If the signed 
scores are compared, it is evident that the 100% Shared, 
Low Centrality condition score was significantly lower 
than scores in the other three conditions. 
The accuracy of diagnosis for these four conditions 
is presented in Figure 2. Most notable are the percentage 
accuracy figures for the 100% Distinctive, High Centrality 
attributes condition (95%) and the 100% Shared, Low 
Centrality attributes condition (10%). In addition, 85% 
accuracy was found in the 100% Shared, High Centrality 
condition; 63% accuracy was found in the 100% 
Distinctive, Low Centrality condition. Thus, it appears 
that attributes that are both shared and low centrality 
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CONDITION (n = 10) 
Figure 2. Percentage of Accurate Diagnoses By Condition 
(Summed Across Diagnostic Category) For 100* or 
0% Distinctive Attributes Group 
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The Main Effects of Attribute Centrality and of Attribute 
Distinctiveness Attribute centrality, regardless of 
level of attribute distinctiveness, appears to have 
influenced accuracy, F(l,9) = 123.86, £ < .0001. The 
utility index indicated that centrality accounted for 46% 
of the variance in the dependent variable. Attribute 
distinctiveness, regardless of attribute centrality, also 
appeared to exert an effect on accuracy, albeit a smaller 
effect than that exhibited by attribute centrality, F(l,9) 
= 16.36, e < .0029. The utility index indicated that 
distinctiveness accounted for 15% of the variance. 
The two High Centrality conditions combined to 
produce a score of +5.3; the two Low Centrality groups 
combined to produce a score of -1.8. The two 100% 
Distinctive conditions combined to produce a score of 
+3.5; the two 100% Shared conditions combined to produce a 
score of 0.0. 
The two High Centrality conditions combined to 
produce 90% accuracy, while the combined accuracy of the 
two Low Centrality conditions was only 36%. Thus, 
profiles with attributes of high centrality produced 
higher accuracy than those with attributes of low 
centrality. 
48 
The two 100% Distinctive groups combined to produce 
79% accuracy; 47% accuracy was produced by the two 100% 
Shared groups. 
First-Choice Data for the 50% Distinctive Attributes Group 
As with the 100% or 0% Distinctive Attributes Group, 
160 first-choice diagnoses were possible. However, only 
158 diagnoses were made (only 39 Antisocial and 39 
Narcissistic). Of the 158 diagnoses, 95, or 60%, were 
accurate. Because the effects of attribute centrality and 
attribute distinctiveness were of primary importance, the 
effects of these variables were examined by summing 
across diagnostic category. 
The profiles in this group all contained 50% shared 
and 50% distinctive attributes. The centrality of the 
distinctive attributes and the centrality of the shared 
attributes were completely crossed. In the first 
condition, all attributes were of high centrality; in the 
second condition, all were peripheral; in the third, the 
distinctive attributes were of high centrality and the 
shared attributes were of low centrality; and in the 
fourth, the shared attributes were of high centrality and 
the distinctive ones, low. In the All Peripheral 
condition, only 38 diagnoses were made; 40 diagnoses were 
made in the other three conditions. 
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The accuracy of diagnosis for these four conditions 
is presented in Figure 3. Most notable are the accuracy 
percentages for the All Central (85%) and All Peripheral 
(24%) conditions. The accuracy percentages for both the 
Distinctive Central-Shared Peripheral and Shared 
Central-Distinctive Peripheral conditions were 65%. Thus, 
it appears that, in the 50% shared, 50% distinctive 
condition, low centrality of attributes produced 
significantly low accuracy. In the same condition, high 
centrality attributes produced significantly high 
accuracy. This effect represents a main effect for 
centrality. The Kruskal-Wallis revealed the main effect 
of the centrality of distinctive attributes, F(l,9) = 
41.81, e < .0001 (see Table 5). Adding the All Central 
and Distinctive Central, Shared Peripheral conditions 
together yielded 75% accuracy, compared that obtained by 
adding the All Peripheral and Shared Central, Distinctive 
Peripheral conditions (45% accuracy). The percentages 
suggest that highly central distinctive attributes 
resulted in greater accuracy than low centrality 
distinctive attributes. The Kruskal-Wallis also revealed 
the effects of the centrality of the shared attributes, 
F (1, 9) = 5.81, e < '039. In this analysis, the All 
Central and Shared Central conditions were combined 



































ca m t-i ai 
v j:  
e a. a) 
u M 
<D 











CONDITION (n = 10) 
Figure 3. Percentage of Accurate Diagnoses By Condition 
(Summed Across Diagnostic Category) For 50% 
Distinctive Attributes Group. 
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Table 5 
Kruskal-Wallis Analysis of Ranks for 50% 
Distinctive Attributes Group: 
First-Choice Diagnosis 
Source df SS MS F P 
Distinctive Central 1 14.4 14.4 41.81 .0001 
Error(D-C) 9 3.1 0.3 






 5.81 .0393 
Error(S-C) 9 15.5 1.7 
Distinct Central 
X Shared Central 1 0.4 0.4 
Error(D-C X S-C) 9 5.6 0.6 
0.64 .4433 
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Peripheral and Distinctive Central, Shared Peripheral 
conditions (which yielded 45% accuracy). The percentages 
suggest that highly central shared attributes resulted in 
greater accuracy than low centrality shared attributes. 
The diagnosis/typica1ity rating data also 
demonstrated the effects of centrality in the 50* 
Distinctive, 50* Shared condition. The scores for the 
four conditions are presented in Figure 4. The highest 
score, +4.5, was obtained in the All Central condition. 
The lowest score, -2.1, was obtained in the All Peripheral 
condition. In the Distinctive Central, Shared Peripheral 
condition, a score of +1.7 was obtained. In the Shared 
Central, Distinctive Peripheral condition, a score of +3.5 
was obtained. 
Analysis of the effects of the centrality of the 
shared attributes was accomplished in the same manner as 
with the diagnosis data alone. Combining the All Central 
and the Shared Central, Distinctive Peripheral conditions 
yielded a score of +4.0; this score was higher than the 
score of -.2 obtained by combining the scores for the All 
Peripheral and Distinctive Central, Shared Peripheral 
conditions. 
The effects of the centrality of distinctive 
attributes also revealed an effect, although a smaller one 
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combined to produce a score of +3.1, while the two 
Distinctive Peripheral conditions combined to produce a 
score of +0.7. 
Comparison of All Eight Experimental Conditions 
As in the previous analysis, the comparisons involved 
an examination of the main effects of the centrality of 
the distinctive attributes and of the shared attributes. 
The Kruskal-Wallis revealed a significant main effect for 
the centrality of the distinctive attributes, F(2,19) = 
25.36, p < .0001 (see Table 6). Tukey's Studentized Range 
Test revealed that distinctive attribute conditions of 
high centrality produce significantly lower ranks (and 
thus significantly higher accuracy/typicality scores) than 
peripheral conditions or conditions where distinctive 
attributes are absent (i.e., the two 0$ Distinctive 
conditions). 
The Kruskal-Wallis also revealed the significant main 
effect of the centrality of shared attributes, F(2, 19) = 
27.5, |> < .0001. Tukey's Test revealed that shared 
attribute conditions of low centrality produce 
s i g n i f i c a n t l y  h i g h e r  r a n k s  ( a n d  t h u s  l o w e r  
accuracy/typicality scores) than peripheral shared 













df SS MS_ 
19 0.0 0.0 
2 30.7 15.4 
2 33.3 16.7 






The experimental hypotheses have been previously 
discussed. Pairwise comparisons among eight conditions 
involves 28 possible comparisons. Direct predictions are 
possible in 20 comparisons. Predictions in the other 
eight comparisons depend on which independent variable 
exerts more control. Small differences, especially in 
between-groups conditions, should be interpreted 
cautiously. The following analysis may only reflect 
trends in the data in some cases. 
The extent to which the model successfully predicts 
outcomes is presented in Table 7. The dependent variable 
predicted was the percentage of accurate diagnosis in each 
condition. In the table, the values for the two 
conditions are entered, along with the predicted relation 
between them. Outcomes were successfully predicted in 19 
of the 20 comparisons which do not depend on the relative 
contributions of attribute centrality and attribute 
distinctiveness. In the one condition not successfully 
predicted, the two conditions had identical values. These 
conditions were the 100* Shared, High Centrality and 50* 
Distinctive-50* Shared, All Central conditions. Thus, in 
none of the 20 conditions is the outcome opposite that 
predicted. 
In eight conditions which depend on whether attribute 
centrality or attribute distinctiveness controls more of 
Table 7 






























1 > 2 
.85 > .10 
3 > 1 
.95 > .85 
1 > 4 (c) 
.85 > .63 
5 > 1 
.85 = .85 
1 > 6 (c) 
.85 > .24 
1 > 7 (c) 
.85 > .65 
1 > 8 (c) 
.85 > .65 
3 > 2 
.95 > .10 
4 > 2 
.63 > .10 
5 > 2 
.85 > .10 
6 > 2 
.24 > .10 
7 > 2 
.65 > .10 
8 > 2 
.65 > .10 
3 > 4 
.95 > .63 
3 > 5 
.95 > .85 
3 > 6 
.95 > .24 
3 > 7 
.95 > .65 
3 > 8 
.95 > .65 
5 > 4 (c) 
.85 > .63 
4 > 6 
.63 > .24 
7 > 4 (c) 
.65 > .63 
8 > 4 (c) 
.65 > .63 
• 
5 > 6 
.85 > .24 
5 > 7 
.85 > .65 
5 > 8 
.85 > .65 
7 > 6 
.65 > .24 
8 > 6 
.65 > .24 
8 > 7 (c) 
.65 =» .65 
at 
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the variance, the results clearly indicate that attribute 
centrality exerted more control over diagnostic accuracy 
than did attribute distinctiveness. In seven of the 
eight conditions, the outcome was consistent with the 
prediction based on centrality being more important than 
distinctiveness. In the other comparison not favoring 
centrality (the Distinctive Central-Shared Peripheral and 
Shared Central-Distinctive Peripheral conditions, both 
involving 50% distinctive and 50* shared attributes), the 
values of the two conditions are identical. Thus, none of 
the outcomes were opposite those predicted based on 
centrality as the more important of the two independent 
variables. 
Analysis of Misdiagnoses 
Within the 100% Shared, Low Centrality condition, the 
percentage of accurate diagnoses for each diagnostic 
category was as follows: Antisocial, 0%; Borderline, 20%; 
Histrionic, 0%; and Narcissistic, 20%. However, 
diagnostic choice was not randomly distributed among the 
diagnostic categories. Most striking was the finding 
that, for the Antisocial profile, 80% of the subjects 
judged the profile to be an example of Narcissistic 
Personality Disorder. Seventy per cent of subjects used 
the Borderline category for the Narcissistic profile. 
Sixty per cent of subjects used the Borderline category 
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for the Histrionic profile. Fifty per cent of subjects 
used the "Other" category for the Borderline profile. 
Examination of the lists of attributes for the four 
categories provides some clues as to why the particular 
diagnoses were made. For example, two attributes in the 
Narcissistic profile ("depressed" and "prone to brief 
psychotic episodes during periods of extreme stress") are 
also attributes of Borderline Personality Disorder. ". . 
. psychotic episodes . . in fact, is a highly central 
attribute of BPD. Similarly, two attributes in the 
Antisocial profile ("relies on self, rather than on the 
opinions of others, for self-esteem" and "highly 
independent") are attributes associated with Narcissistic 
Personality Disorder. One attribute in the Histrionic 
profile ("shows impaired reality testing under stress") is 
a highly central attribute of Borderline Personality 
Disorder. Further evidence of the effect of this 
particular attribute on diagnosis is found by examining 
the attributes listed as important to diagnosing the 
Histrionic case by the one subject who received this case 
last, and diagnosed it as a Borderline case. It was 
found that the subject had indeed included this attribute 
in her list, and in fact had listed it as the most 
important attribute in her diagnostic choice. 
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Within the All Peripheral condition, the percentage 
of accurate diagnoses for each diagnostic category was as 
follows: Antisocial, 56*; Borderline, 20*; Histrionic, 
0%; and Narcissistic, 22*. However, diagnostic choice was 
not randomly distributed among the category choices. For 
the Borderline profile, 50* of subjects used the "Other" 
category; for the Histrionic profile, 70* used the 
Borderline category; for the Narcissistic profile, 67* 
used the "Other" category. In addition, the Distinctive 
Central, Shared Peripheral condition for the Narcissistic 
profile yielded only 20* accuracy; 70* of subjects used 
the Borderline category to diagnose this case. Also, for 
the Shared Central, Distinctive Peripheral condition for 
the Antisocial profile, only 20* accuracy was achieved; 
50* of subjects used the Borderline category. 
Examination of the lists of attributes for the 
Narcissistic and Borderline categories suggests a 
contributing factor to the use of the Borderline category 
in diagnosing the Narcissistic profile by 50* of subjects. 
One of the shared attributes in the Narcissistic profile 
("prone to brief psychotic episodes during periods of 
extreme stress") is a highly central attribute of 
Borderline Personality Disorder. The presence of this 
attribute may have contributed to the use of the 
Borderline category for this Narcissistic case. This 
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conclusion is strengthened by the previously mentioned 
results concerning the Group One data, in which 70% of 
subjects responding to the 10095 Shared, Low Centrality 
condition for the Narcissistic profile chose the 
Borderline category. "Prone to brief psychotic 
episodes ..." was, of course, also an attribute in this 
Narcissistic profile. 
Second Choice Data 
Data for 100% or 0% Distinctive Attributes Group 
Subjects were accurate on 101 of 160 first choice 
diagnoses. Consequently, 59 second-choice opportunities 
were available for analysis. The percentage accuracy 
figures for second-choice data are presented in Figure 2. 
The number of second-choice opportunities differed for the 
four conditions, and the relative accuracy scores for the 
four conditions paralleled the findings for the 
first-choice data. That is, the highest percentage 
accuracy was found for the 100% Distinctive, High 
Centrality condition (100% accuracy, based on two correct 
diagnoses out of two second-choice opportunities), while 
the lowest percentage accuracy was found for the 100% 
Shared, Low Centrality condition (31%, 11 correct in 36 
opportunities). Again, the 100% Shared, High Centrality 
condition produced high accuracy (83%, 5 out of 6). 
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Accuracy was 33% (5/15) in the 100% Distinctive, Low 
Centrality condition. 
Second-choice accuracy/typicality results are 
presented in Figure 1. As was the case with the 
first-choice accuracy/typicality data, the highest score, 
+ 3.5, was obtained in the 100% Distinctive, High 
Centrality condition. The lowest score, -.83, was 
obtained in the 100% Shared, Low Centrality condition. In 
the 100% Shared, High Centrality condition, the score was 
+2.83. In the 100% Distinctive, Low Centrality condition, 
the score was -0.8. The main effect for centrality is 
again evident. The two high centrality conditions 
combined to produce a score of +3.16. The two low 
centrality conditions combined to produce a score of 
-0.82. 
No effect for distinctiveness appeared in the 
accuracy/typicality data. The two 100% Distinctive 
conditions combine to produce a score of +1.35. The two 
100% Shared conditions combine to produce a score of +1.0. 
Data for 50% Distinctive Attributes Group. Subjects 
were accurate on 95 of 158 first-choice diagnoses. 
Therefore, 63 second-choice diagnostic opportunities were 
possible. Four second-choice diagnoses were missing in 
the All Peripheral condition. Thus, 59 second-choice 
diagnoses were made. The number of second-choice 
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diagnoses varied in the four conditions. The percentage 
accuracy results are presented in Figure 3. As with the 
first-choice data, the lowest accuracy, 44%, was obtained 
in the All Peripheral condition (11 correct diagnoses out 
of 25 opportunities). However, contrary to expectations, 
the Distinctive Central, Shared Peripheral condition 
produced the highest accuracy, 71% (10 correct out of 14 
opportunities) . The All Central condition, expected to 
produce the highest accuracy, produced 67% accuracy (4 out 
of 6 correct). The small number of second-choice 
opportunities in this condition, compared to the number of 
opportunities in the Distinctive Central, Shared 
Peripheral condition, may have influenced the relative 
accuracy in these two conditions. In the Shared Central, 
Distinctive Peripheral condition, accuracy reached 50% (7 
out of 14 correct). 
The centrality of distinctive attributes was 
examined as it was with the first choice data. The two 
Distinctive Central conditions combined to produce 69% 
accuracy, while the two Distinctive Peripheral conditions 
combined to produce 47% accuracy. 
The centrality of shared attributes was also 
examined. The two Shared Central conditions combined to 
produce 58% accuracy, while the two Shared Peripheral 
conditions also combine to produce 58% accuracy. Thus, it 
64 
appears that the centrality of distinctive attributes was 
more important than the centrality of shared ones in the 
second-choice diagnostic data. 
The second-choice accuracy/typicality data (presented 
in Figure 4) mirrored the findings for the accuracy data 
alone. The All Peripheral condition produced the lowest 
score, -0.54. However, the Distinctive Central, Shared 
Peripheral condition produced the highest score, +1.43. 
The All Central condition produced a score of +1.17. The 
Shared Central, Distinctive Peripheral condition produced 
a score of -0.29. 
The centrality of distinctive attributes was examined 
by combining the two distinctive conditions, producing a 
score of +1.3, and comparing this score to that obtained 
in the two Distinctive Peripheral conditions, -0.42. 
The centrality of shared attributes was examined by 
combining the two Shared Central conditions, producing a 
score of +0.44, and comparing this score to that obtained 
by combining the two Shared Peripheral conditions, which 
produces a score of +0.45. 
Attribute Listing Data 
After subjects had provided diagnoses for their final 
case, they were asked to answer some questions about how 
they arrived at their first-choice diagnosis for that 
case. Specifically, they were asked to refer back to the 
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profile, and list all the profile attributes which were 
important to them in arriving at their diagnosis. They 
were asked to rank the attributes they listed in order of 
importance, with the most important attributes listed 
first. In addition, they were asked to rate the 
importance of each attribute on a scale of one to five, in 
terms of its importance to them in making their diagnosis. 
This procedure was designed essentially as a check on 
the independent variable. It was assumed that there would 
be some relationship between subjects' category choice and 
the order of the attributes they listed as important. 
Generally, it was hypothesized that subjects would list 
distinctive and shared attributes in order of their 
centrality to the category chosen, regardless of which 
group subjects were in. If a profile contained 
distinctive and shared attributes, the distinctive 
attributes would be listed before the shared ones (except 
in the Shared Central, Distinctive Peripheral condition, 
where the prediction depends on whether centrality or 
distinctiveness is the more important variable). 
The principle stated in the previous paragraph is 
most clearly illustrated by examining the Distinctive 
High, Shared Low condition when attributes are 50% 
distinctive and 50* shared. For any of the four 
diagnostic categories, it is predicted that a subject 
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whose diagnosis is accurate will list the distinctive 
attributes before listing the shared ones. It is also 
predicted that the subject will list the high centrality 
attributes before listing the peripheral ones. Since the 
distinctive attributes are also the high centrality ones, 
and the shared attributes are also the peripheral ones, 
the prediction holds regardless of whether centrality or 
distinctiveness is the more controlling variable. 
Examining the Antisocial profile in this condition 
provides both an illustration and the best example of a 
good fit between prediction and outcome. The profile 
itself is included, along with all other profiles, in 
Appendix B. The distinctive attributes, in order of their 
centrality (with the most central attribute listed first) 
are: "unlawful behavior"; "disregard for the consequences 
of his/her actions"; and "disregard for the feelings of 
others." The shared attributes, in order of their 
centrality (with the most peripheral attribute listed 
last), are: "interprets minor slights as major insults"; 
"haughty and arrogant"; and "uncomfortable when alone for 
more than brief periods of time." This is the order in 
which it is predicted that subjects would list these 
attributes for this profile if they chose Antisocial as 
their first-choice diagnosis. 
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Complete analysis of these data may only be 
accomplished if the subject is accurate in their category 
choice, and if they list attributes which are in the 
profile; if accurate, the subjects' attribute list may be 
compared to the full attribute list for the category 
chosen. 
The attribute listing data are provided in Table 8. 
Eleven of twenty subjects were accurate in their choice of 
category and listed only attributes in the profile. Three 
subjects were inaccurate in their diagnosis, but chose one 
of the four primary categories. They listed attributes 
from the profile. Two subjects incorrectly used "Other" 
category labels. Two subjects appear not to have 
understood the instructions, because the attributes they 
listed were not in the profile. Data were missing for one 
subject. And one subject was accurate, but some of the 
attributes listed were not in the profile. There was 
variability in the number of attributes listed by 
subjects. An average of 3.55 attributes were listed; the 
range was two to six. A great deal of variability also 
was present in the order in which subjects listed 
attributes. The clearest finding which supports the 
predictions made concerns the presence, anywhere in the 
attribute list, of the attribute expected to be listed 
first. For 10 of 11 subjects (91%), this attribute did 
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Table 8 
The Order of Attributes Listed by Subjects Who Accurately 
Diagnosed Their Last Case, and Listed Only 
Attributes From Their Profiles 
Subject Order of 
Number Attributes 
1 1 2 
2 4 1 5 2 
3 6 4 1 
4 1 2 5 
5 6 4 5 
6 1 4 2 3 
7 5 4 3 6 
8 4 1 2 
9 1 2 3 4 
10 3 1 6 4 
11 1 2 
appear in the list, though the lists averaged less than 
four attributes. Further, for those 10 subjects including 
this attribute, five, or 50%, listed it first (i.e., most 
important). The second expected attribute also was 
listed frequently, in eight of 11 lists. It occurred 
after Attribute #1 every time, and before Attributes 3-6 
five of the eight times. Attribute #6 only showed up in a 
list of less than six attributes three times. In three of 
the eleven lists, the attributes were ordered perfectly, 
according to the predicted model, three times. In no case 
was the listing done totally opposite of the predictions 
(though one subject almost did). Thus, it appears that 
there is some evidence to suggest that the subjects were 
responding to the stimuli in the way predicted. 
As previously mentioned, the Antisocial profile in 
the Distinctive Central, Shared Peripheral condition (50% 
Distinctive, 50% Shared attributes) provided the best 
example of the fit between prediction and outcome. One 
subject responded to this condition. The order in which 
it was predicted the attributes would be listed has been 
previously alluded to. This subject listed five of the 
six attributes as being important in diagnosing the case 
as Antisocial. The subject listed all of the distinctive 
attributes first, in the predicted order; the subject then 
listed the two shared attributes with the highest 
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centrality. This is Subject 9 in Table 8. The subject 
whose data appeared to fit the predictions least well was 
Subject 5. This subject was responding to the 
Narcissistic profile in the 100% Distinctive, High 
Centrality condition. The subject listed three 
attributes, but listed the attribute expected to be listed 
sixth, first. The subject listed the fourth attribute 
second, and the fifth attribute third. The subject did 
not even list the attributes that occupied the first three 
places in terms of centrality. However, it is important 
to note that the centrality of the attribute expected to 
be listed first is only .82 points higher than the 




Low diagnostic agreement among clinicians has, in the 
past, been thought to reflect either inadequate training 
of diagnosticians or problems in the diagnostic system 
being used. These presumptions are the outgrowth of the 
classical view of diagnosis dominating the field. In 
contrast, an alternative view, the prototype approach, has 
been advanced recently. This approach posits that 
attributes of categories may be correlated imperfectly 
with category membership. That instances may be judged to 
be better or worse examples of categories may be due, not 
to overlap in the number of category attributes the 
instance exhibits, but to overlap in attributes central or 
peripheral to category membership. In addition, 
categories vary in the extent to which they share 
attributes with other categories. An instance may 
exhibit attributes which are distinctive to only one 
category, or which are shared by more than one. In this 
latter case, diagnostic judgment is assumed to be more 
difficult if the person is attempting to assign a primary 
diagnosis. The presence of attributes which are 
peripheral and are shared by more than one category are 
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assumed by this approach to produce great confusion, and 
hence low agreement, in clinical diagnostic judgment. 
In the present study, agreement among clinicians in 
diagnostic judgment was examined as a function of the 
nature of the attributes in personality profiles presented 
to them. Clinicians were presented with profiles 
developed from lists of attributes of four categories of 
personality disorder. The profiles contained attributes 
which were either distinctive to the category from which 
the attributes were drawn, or were shared by more than one 
category. The attributes, in addition, were either highly 
central to the category from which they were drawn, or 
were peripheral to it. The number of attributes in the 
profiles was strictly controlled to eliminate variance due 
to this factor. In addition, the sex of the person in the 
profile, thought to affect diagnosis for the categories 
utilized, was not divulged. The primary hypothesis was 
that attribute centrality and attribute distinctiveness 
would interact to produce the maximum effect on diagnostic 
judgment. Specifically, it was hypothesized that 
profiles containing all peripheral attributes which were 
shared by more than one category would produce the lowest 
levels of diagnostic agreement; conversely, the highest 
levels of agreement would be exhibited to profiles in 
which all the attributes were of high centrality to a 
73 
category and distinctive to it. Main effects were also 
predicted for each of the independent variables alone. 
Support for the experimental hypotheses was provided 
by a statistical analysis of the first-choice diagnostic 
data. In the design in which attribute centrality (high 
or low) was completely crossed with attribute 
distinctiveness (100% distinctive attributes or 100% 
shared attributes), the strongest effect was produced by 
centrality (although the main effect for distinctiveness 
was also significant, as was the interaction). 
The second-choice data strengthen the conclusions 
drawn from examining the first-choice data. While too few 
second-choice data were available for statistical 
analysis, visual analysis reveals that the second-choice 
data parallel the first-choice data. That is, the highest 
accuracy level as obtained in the 100% Distinctive, High 
Centrality condition, while the lowest accuracy level was 
in the 100% Shared, Low Centrality condition. In fact, in 
the 100% Distinctive, High Centrality condition, 100% 
accuracy was obtained. 
Several general conclusions of the present study may 
be made. The most important conclusion is that the 
prototype approach appears to be useful in helping us to 
understand psychiatric diagnosis. This conclusion is 
important because, despite the growing theoretical 
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influence of the prototype model in psychiatric diagnosis, 
this study is one of only a handful of experiments testing 
its application in the area of diagnosis. It is the first 
known experimental examination of subjects' responses in 
the area of personality disorders (in Blashfield et al. , 
1985, the focus of the research on personality disorders 
was on the cases themselves, not directly the clinicians' 
responses to them). 
Secondly, from the present study it may be concluded 
that some of the assumptions from the seminal research in 
this area (Cantor et al. , 1980) require re-examination. 
The present study included a thorough critique, both 
theoretically and methodologically, of this pioneering 
research. As Blashfield and Sprock (unpublished, 1983) 
note, the Cantor et al. (1980) study has generated a great 
deal of interest, and has received many citations in the 
literature. Its current influence extends to a call by 
one of the leading, if not the leading, researcher and 
writer on personality disorders (Millon, 1986), for the 
prototype model to become the accepted model for 
conceptualizing personality disorders. There are 
indications that much additional research will be 
conducted in the area of prototypes. Therefore, it is 
important that theoretical and methodological issues 
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arising from Cantor et al.'s work be raised and examined 
empirically. 
Third, while questioning the reason for the findings 
obtained by Cantor et al. , (1980), the present study also 
confirms explicitly some of the predictions about 
diagnosis arising within the prototype framework. For 
example, the assumption by Cantor et al. that number of 
attributes was responsible for variability in diagnosis 
is questioned by the strong effect of attribute centrality 
in the present study. However, the findings of the 
present study confirm the importance of the presence of 
category-congruent attributes in influencing diagnostic 
judgment. 
The implications of the finding of a strong main 
effect for attribute centrality is discussed in the next 
section. Other areas within the scope of this research 
are then discussed. These include: diagnosis based on 
Cantor and Mischel's (1979) notion of "full" versus 
"restricted" view; the importance of attribute centrality 
and attribute distinctiveness in proposing how the 
diagnostic process may operate; a re-examination of Cantor 
et al. (1980) findings, including appropriate statistical 
analysis of accuracy/typicality data; and a look at 
Borderline Personality as a possible "catch-all" category 
for otherwise poor category fits. 
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Cognition and Diagnostic Assessment 
Cantor and Genero (1986) have used the prototype 
approach and their findings in applying the approach to 
psychiatric diagnosis to propose how the diagnostic 
process should work. Briefly, the authors suggest that 
diagnosis is simultaneously an attempt by the 
diagnostician to determine both "what it is" (i. e., to 
what category the person to be diagnosed does belong) and 
"what it isn't" (to what category does the person not 
belong). The cognitive process for determining "what it 
is" is similarity-matching to the closest target category 
(similarity-matching refers to determining how many 
category-congruent attributes the person exhibits). The 
cognitive process for determining "what it isn't" is 
differentiation from neighboring categories 
(differentiation is a process by which categories are 
"ruled out" because their prototypes do not contain the 
attributes which the person exhibits). 
The model suggests that these processes work in 
concert to help the diagnostician determine how typical 
the person is of the most likely category, and to rule out 
as many alternative categories as possible. Failure to 
rule out all alternative categories should alert the 
diagnostician to the possible atypicality of the case or 
the appropriateness of a mixed or multiple diagnosis. 
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While the above model describes an ideal process for 
diagnostic judgment, it does not adequately explain the 
results of the present study. The above model would 
predict that in the present study attribute centrality and 
attribute distinctiveness would produce approximately the 
same effect on diagnosis. The findings of the present 
study, however, were that attribute centrality produced 
the more powerful effect. This finding suggests the need 
to consider further how diagnostic judgment may operate. 
A revision in the Cantor and Genero (1986) model may 
account for these findings. Essentially, it is suggested 
that diagnosis be conceptualized primarily as a 
similarity-matching process. Diagnosticians are primarily 
concerned with "what it is", not with "what it isn't." 
When a diagnostician first encounters a patient, the first 
attribute which the person exhibits "cues" one (if it is a 
distinct attribute) or more (if it is shared) prototypes 
"in the head" of the diagnostician. Each subsequent 
attribute observed either adds to (if it is category 
congruent) or subtracts from (if it is category 
incongruent) existing prototypes under consideration, 
and/or introduces one or more prototype categories to 
consider. When all the information to be used in 
diagnosis has been obtained, the diagnostician is able to 
perform a similarity-matching process for all of the cued 
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prototypes. The closest matching category is the category 
most likely to be chosen by the diagnostician. Of course, 
the match must be similar enough for the diagnostician to 
choose any category. 
This proposed process suggests a single goal of 
diagnosis: not to determine "what it is" and "what it 
isn't", but to determine "what it is most likely." This 
implies primarily a similarity-matching process. The 
model proposed here does not suggest that differentiation 
is unimportant to diagnosis. Rather, the proposed model 
suggests that the most important aspect of 
differentiation (i. e., whether attributes are distinctive 
to one category or are shared by more than one) is 
incorporated into the similarity-matching process. As 
previously stated, an attribute which is distinctive to a 
single category may only add to the "cue validity" 
(ability of a body of information to cue a particular 
prototype) to that category. However, a shared attribute 
adds to the cue validity of every prototype of which it is 
a member. The degree to which it adds to the cue validity 
of each prototype depends on its centrality to that 
prototype. 
A weakness of the Cantor and Genero and the proposed 
alternate model is that neither explains misdiagnosis. 
Misdiagnosis is probably best explained with reference to 
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individual variation in the prototype categories of 
individual diagnosticians. As was mentioned in the 
Results under Misdiagnosis, shared features of low 
centrality may have resulted in very close values of cue 
validity for different categories. Individual variation 
in perceived attribute centrality may have been 
responsible for misdiagnosis in this condition. The 
current model, which relies on a nomothetic approach to 
assessment of the structural properties of prototypes in 
the mind of diagnosticians, will often fail to predict 
with high accuracy all of the diagnostic judgments an 
individual makes. An alternative approach, utilizing 
ideographic assessment, may enhance predictability. In 
either case, however, the diagnostic process is probably 
the same. 
One final remark in this section concerns a possible 
line of research to determine when attribute 
distinctiveness would play a more important role in 
diagnosis. Cantor and Genero's (1986) model suggests that 
differentiation is important in determining "what it 
isn't." A useful direction for research in this area 
would involve asking diagnosticians to "rule out" 
categories, but not necessarily to make diagnoses. 
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Diagnosis as Person Categorization Under "Restricted View" 
In their most comprehensive presentation of the 
prototype approach in the area of personality, Cantor and 
Mischel (1979a) proposed two different situations in which 
persons might categorize others. In the situation they 
referred to as "full view", the categorizer had an 
opportunity to sample a wide range of the behaviors of the 
person to be categorized, by observing them for 
substantial periods of time on several occasions. In 
such a situation, it was proposed that the number of 
category-congruent features exhibited by the person to be 
categorized would be a crucial determinant in how they 
were categorized. 
However, the authors noted that sometimes people 
categorize others after only a "limited view" of them. 
That is, people may categorize others despite observing 
them for only a short time on one occasion. In this 
situation, it was proposed that categorization would be 
guided by the target person's exhibiting the most central 
category-congruent attributes. 
Cantor et al.'s (1980) operational independent 
variable clearly implies a "full view" of the patient. 
The authors manipulated proposed patient typicality by 
varying the number of category-congruent attributes in the 
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case histories. Feature centrality was not mentioned as a 
variable that might affect the diagnostic judgments made. 
In reality, however, diagnoses are often made under 
conditions more closely approximating "limited view" than 
"full view." In practice, initial diagnostic judgments 
may be made after the diagnostician has spent only one 
initial intake session of 50 minutes with the patient. In 
fact, such judgments are sometimes required by 
administrators or third-party payers. In such situations, 
it is reasonable to assume that diagnosticians will be 
impressed by the presence or absence of attributes which 
are central to categories under consideration. 
The present study clearly demonstrated that variance 
in diagnostic accuracy can occur despite holding the 
number of attributes at a low, constant level. Six 
attributes (in the low-medium range according to Cantor 
et al.'s standard) was sufficient to produce high 
accuracy if the six were all distinctive and highly 
central to a single category. Moreover, high accuracy in 
this condition was not an artifact of the correspondence 
between the profiles and the DSM-III diagnostic system. 
Only one of the profiles (the Histrionic one) met the DSM-
III criteria for diagnosis. High accuracy despite this 
lack of correspondence suggests that subjects shared a 
consensual construct of the disorders, abstracted from 
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knowledge "in the head" of the clinician. However, six 
attributes produced very low accuracy when all six were 
peripheral to a category and shared by other categories. 
However, the present study is not intended to show 
that attribute number is not an important variable for 
understanding diagnosis. What is important to understand 
is that the present study indicated that which attributes 
are in a body of information, not just how many of them 
there are, is also important in the diagnostic process. 
The "limited view" model of person categorization 
suggests an interesting line of research. How might 
feature number and feature centrality affect how typical 
patients are considered of categories of diagnosis? How 
few central category attributes need to be exhibited by a 
patient to induce a diagnostician to assign a diagnostic 
label? How many peripheral ones may be needed? No 
research has so far addressed these specific questions. 
Additional Comments on Cantor et al. (1980) 
As previously mentioned, Cantor et al.'s (1980) 
pioneering work on prototypes and diagnosis has generated 
a great deal of theoretical interest in the clinical area. 
The theory, method, results, and conclusions appear to 
have been accepted largely at face value. However, for 
research in this area to advance, it is necessary to build 
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upon the strengths of the research, while at the same time 
refining it theoretically and methodologically. 
Alternative explanations for the findings of the 
study, which provide the bridge to the present research, 
have already been alluded to on several occasions, and 
will not be repeated. However, additional considerations 
not previously discussed deserve mention. These 
considerations include: selection of case histories 
presumed to represent diagnostic categories; case history 
information presumed to represent attributes; and choice 
of statistical analysis in light of the measurement of the 
dependent variable. 
Cantor et al . ( 1980) state that the stimulus 
materials used in their study were case histories 
representing the four diagnostic categories chosen. The 
cases had been diagnosed, using those category labels, at 
the mental health facility from which they were taken. 
The diagnoses were presumed accurate, and were used as the 
standard against which to compare the diagnoses of 
subjects in the study. The authors do not say how many 
diagnosticians made the diagnoses, nor how they arrived at 
the diagnoses. If several diagnosticians used objective 
means to arrive at the diagnoses, then confidence in the 
accuracy of the diagnoses is enhanced. But if a single 
diagnostician used subjective means to arrive at the 
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diagnoses, then the assumption of accuracy becomes 
problematic. Subjective diagnostic judgment is the focus 
of the research, and becomes, in light of the study's 
findings, an issue in the selection of cases. 
In the present study, profiles were chosen to 
represent diagnoses on the basis of their inclusion in 
lists of attributes for those categories. In all-shared 
conditions, profiles were examined to assure that no 
category other than the specified one shared all of the 
attributes. To assure that high attribute centrality for 
shared categories did not make the profile more 
representative of those categories than of the one 
specified, cue validities were estimated for the specified 
category and for the next most representative category 
(based on number of attributes congruent with that 
category) . The estimation procedure took advantage of 
Livesley's data on attribute centrality, and was 
accomplished by simply adding together the centrality 
values for the attributes common to the category. 
The cue validity for the specified category was 
always higher. Thus, there is reason to believe that the 
profiles represented the appropriate categories. 
Second, the use of case histories in Cantor et al. 
(1980) suggests that the information available to subjects 
may have been in the form of behavior as well as traits. 
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In the present study, personality profiles containing only 
traits were utilized. In terms of external validity, the 
Cantor et al . study appears to have the advantage. 
However, not enough is known about the relationship 
between traits and behaviors in person categorization (for 
example, how one leads to inference about the other). The 
present study eliminated the need for inference, possibly 
reducing one potential source of variance. The key point 
to be made here is that behaviors vary in terms of how 
typical they are of traits. One act may easily cue a 
trait, while another behavior cues the trait less well. 
Because the prototype approach assumes that the cognitive 
structures in the mind of the categorizer consists of 
traits, early research efforts should probably attempt to 
assure that categorizers receive trait information, as was 
done in the present study. 
Actually, the relationship between behavior and 
traits inferred from it is an active line of research 
currently being pursued by Buss and Craik (1986). Called 
the act-frequency approach to assessment, this 
methodology relies on the nomination of typical acts to 
represent dispositions, and statistical manipulations 
which reveal patterns in the relationship between behavior 
and traits. As the authors note, the act-frequency 
approach begins with the assumption that the basic purpose 
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of clinical classificatory systems is to describe 
individuals. Act-frequency research involves personality 
assessment, specifically analysis of dispositional 
constructs (concepts that summarize general trends in 
conduct). The starting point of this research involves 
"identifying the internal cognitive structure of 
dispositions by exploring the acts subsumed by them and 
the status of specific acts with respect to dispositional 
categories" (Buss & Craik, p. 389). In the clinical area, 
the act- frequency approach entails the analysis of 
multiple dispositional constructs which constitute 
personality disorders, and the use of clinical experts in 
the assessment process. The authors also note that the 
act frequency approach "accords well" with the prototype 
approach to diagnosis. Both approaches recognize the 
fuzzy structure of psychiatric categories and the 
heterogeneity of category membership. The similarity 
matching process may also be applied to act portraits 
generated using the act-frequency approach. This 
approach, as the authors note, has direct implications for 
the conceptual analysis of personality disorders. 
The final point concerns the statistical analysis 
used in the Cantor et al. (1980) study. In the study, the 
accuracy/typicality scores were analyzed using a standard 
analysis of variance (presumably with repeated measures). 
87 
This analysis was also proposed for the present study. 
However, examination of the data obtained in the present 
study rendered use of ANOVA problematic. It was 
discovered that the accuracy/typicality scores were not 
normally distributed, a requirement for the use of ANOVA. 
Instead, unimodal and bimodal distributions, reflecting 
high typicality scores for correct and/or incorrect 
diagnoses, were the rule. These distributions served to 
make the effects of the independent variables stand out 
descriptively, but suggested that a nonparametric 
statistic was more appropriate to assist with making 
probability statements. Kruskal-Wallis with repeated 
measures was ultimately determined to be the appropriate 
statistic. 
Since Cantor et al. (1980) presented their raw data 
in their paper, it was possible to visually examine the 
probable distributions of scores around their condition 
means. This examination revealed unimodal and bimodal 
distributions only slightly less pronounced than those in 
the present study. Therefore, it is suggested that their 
analysis, while probably not obscuring their basic 
findings, was inappropriate. 
To complete the picture, it should be noted that 
controversy exists in the statistical literature regarding 
the consequences of violating the assumption of normally 
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distributed variance in using ANOVA. It is not clear that 
ANOVA is inappropriate in all such cases. The above 
discussion should simply alert those using confidence or 
typicality scores in judgment research to the possibility 
of this statistical issue being raised. 
Diagnosis and Borderline Personality Disorder 
Borderline Personality Disorder has been one of the 
more controversial DSM-III diagnostic categories (Millon, 
19981; Wideger, 1986). Among the criticisms of this 
diagnosis is that it is a poorly conceived diagnosis 
which has become a "wastebasket" diagnosis for patients 
who do not fit into other diagnostic categories. 
Evidence supporting or refuting this proposition, however, 
has been lacking. The types of evidence which would shed 
light in this area are of two types: overlap between the 
Borderline category and other categories; and examination 
of misdiagnoses using the Borderline category. 
Livesley (1986) has written on the extent of overlap 
between and among the personality disorder categories. 
Borderline PD is one of the four categories which shows 
maximum overlap of attributes. This overlapping, 
according to Cantor et al. (1980), sets the occasion for 
misdiagnosis when the patient exhibits attributes shared 
by more than one category. This sharing of attributes was 
studied as an independent variable in the present study. 
In this study, there were nine conditions in which 
the accuracy of diagnosis was less than 50*. In the 
majority of these conditions, the category incorrectly 
chosen was Borderline PD. Upon first glance, such a 
finding might suggest that Borderline Personality Disorder 
is indeed a wastebasket category, used whenever a good fit 
with another category cannot be obtained. However, upon 
closer examination, some logic as to the choice of this 
category appears. 
An examination of the conditions under which BPD was 
diagnosed instead of the correct category, and the nature 
of those conditions, reveals some interesting 
possibilities about the BPD diagnosis. In the conditions 
in which the BPD diagnosis was chosen, examination of the 
overlap of attributes of the intended diagnosis and the 
Borderline PD was made. Overlap of attributes with the 
Borderline category would explain the use of this 
diagnosis. 
In the majority of the conditions, the intended 
category shared at least one attribute with BPD. In one 
case, two attributes were shared. Moreover, one of the 
shared attributes was a high centrality attribute of BPD. 
The presence of a high centrality BPD attribute might 
explain why the category was chosen. 
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Further examination of the shared attributes suggests 
another possibility regarding the choice of BPD in these 
conditions. In one condition, the shared attribute was 
"shows impaired reality testing under stress." In two 
other conditions, the shared attribute was "prone to brief 
psychotic episodes during periods of extreme stress." 
These attributes suggest severe impairment of function, 
which is consistent with how BPD is conceived in relation 
to other personality disorders. Along with Schizotypal 
and Paranoid Personality Disorders, BPD is considered a 
severe form of personality disorder. It may be that 
diagnosticians in the present study were responding 
primarily to their perception of the severity of 
impairment rather than to the nature of the impairment. 
This may be especially true since neither Schizotypal nor 
Paranoid Personality Disorder were offered as diagnostic 
alternatives in the present study. Future research into 
the use of BPD as an indicator of severity might study its 
use in relation to other severe forms of personality 
disorder. 
Limitations of Present Study 
The present study examined the effects of attribute 
centrality and attribute distinctiveness on diagnostic 
accuracy and typicality ratings. In it, trained clinical 
psychologists were presented with personality profiles in 
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which the centrality and distinctiveness of attributes 
varied systematically. They were asked to provide first-
and second-choice diagnoses and typicality ratings. The 
results of the study demonstrated that the main effects 
of, and the interaction between, attribute centrality and 
attribute distinctiveness were significant. It was 
concluded that the data provided support for the prototype 
approach to diagnosis, but that a model based primarily on 
similarity matching was more consistent with the results 
than a model based equally on similarity matching and 
differentiation. 
The study included several controls designed to 
enhance its internal validity. Despite (or perhaps 
because of) this control, there are limitations to the 
study. These limitations primarily involve the stimulus 
materials and the procedures. They are offered as a way 
of raising issues relevant to future research in this 
area. 
In terms of stimulus materials, it is important to 
consider the source of the lists of attributes used in the 
study. The lists were not obtained by asking clinicians 
to list the attributes they associate with the diagnostic 
categories in the study (as Cantor et al. , 1980, did). 
Instead, the attribute lists were obtained by examining 
the major literature in the area of personality disorders. 
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One would intuitively expect the two different procedures 
to yield greatly overlapping lists. However, there may be 
attributes perceived by clinicians as associated with the 
categories which are not on the lists. Future research 
should continue to examine the attributes clinicians 
really use in diagnosis. 
The stimulus materials presented to the clinicians 
were personality profiles containing only traits. Cantor 
et al. (1980) used actual case history information in 
their study. While, as discussed earlier, it may be 
premature to use behavioral information in forming the 
information to be presented, eventually such effort should 
be made. As the relationship between behavior and traits 
becomes clearer, the use of behavioral information will be 
more useful. 
In terms of procedures, the present study was 
conducted through the mail using written information. 
Better control over subject responding, resulting in lower 
error variance, may be achieved by conducting studies 
personally in the clinicians' offices. Enhanced external 
validity may only be achieved by closer analogy to the 
environment in which clinicians work. 
Also, the subjects in this research were all 
clinicians who had been licensed for five or more years. 
Consequently, differences may exist between these 
clinicians and less experienced ones, which could limit 
the external validity of the results. For example, many 
of the subjects in the present study may have been trained 
before both DSM-III and the advent of the prototype 
approach to diagnosis. It is conceivable that the 
tendency of subjects to use high typicality ratings in all 
conditions may have been associated with their being 
trained before the changes in thinking about diagnosis 
occurred. In addition, some evidence does exist in the 
literature on prototypes which points to differences 
between experienced and inexperienced clinicians, in the 
richness of the prototypes formed by the two groups 
(Horowitz, Wright, Lowenstein, & Parad, 1981). These 
potential group differences accentuate the need to learn 
more about the development of diagnostic judgment across 
the professional lifespan of the diagnostician. 
Subjects in the present study were directed to use 
one of four diagnostic categories or write in a diagnosis. 
In the real world, clinicians utilize an open-ended choice 
format. Actually, the present study improved on Cantor 
et al . ( 1980), in which a true four-choice only 
multiple-choice format was used. Although in the present 
study subjects often wrote in their choice of category, it 
is true that the response format may have guided them 
toward using one of the four primary categories. An 
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open-ended choice format that includes either all of the 
personality disorder categories or none of them enhances 
external validity. 
Conclusions 
The research by Cantor et al. (1980) is laudable for 
several reasons. Its most creative contribution is that 
it represents a good example of the application of ideas 
in one area of psychology to other areas. The prototype 
model originally was used in cognitive psychology to 
advance knowledge about the categorization of objects. 
Its successful application to the personality and clinical 
areas suggests that there is great value to clinical 
psychologists being familiar with basic content areas in 
psychology. 
The study has also been used as a cornerstone in the 
development of a theoretical model for understanding 
diagnosis (Cantor and Genero, 1986). This model may be 
examined empirically, refined, and used to further 
understanding. Hopefully, the present study is a good 
example of an empirical examination of the model. 
Finally, the work done by Cantor et al . has 
practical value for clinical psychology. Its attribute 
listing methodology should be helpful in refining the 
DSM-III categories. Diagnostician training can take into 
account the variables that lead to accurate diagnosis, and 
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encourage diagnosticians to defer diagnosis, or to use 
mixed or multiple diagnosis when patients fail to easily 
fit categories. 
The present study is not offered as a refutation of 
the work of Cantor et al. The frequent reference to this 
work in the literature assures that it will remain the 
seminal pioneering effort in this research area. Instead, 
the present study is offered as an expansion and 
refinement of the ideas expressed in this earlier work. 
As such, it hopefully represents the spirit of progress in 
science in general, and psychology in particular. 
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APPENDIX A 
Solicitation Letter 
THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA 
AT GREENSBORO 
Department of Psychology 
My name is Ron Boykin. I am a Licensed Psychological Associate, and a candi­
date for the Ph.D. degree in clinical psychology here at UNC-Greensboro. I am 
writing to ask if you would be willing to serve as a subject in my disserta­
tion research. The study deals with diagnosing personality disorders. It is 
designed to take less than one hour of your time and, because the materials can 
be mailed to you, can be completed at home. This project is being supervised 
by J.W. White, Ph.D., and has been endorsed by our department's Human Subjects 
Review Committee. 
Practicing Clinical Psychologists who have been permanently licensed for at 
least three years, and whose current professional activities include diagnosing 
personality disorders, are being asked to participate. If you agree to parti­
cipate, you will receive a packet containing information about several hypothe­
tical individuals. After you have read and thought about each individual, you 
will be adked to provide some of your diagnostic impressions of him or her. 
The study is not designed as a test of your knowledge or a reflection of your 
clinical ability. Rather, it is designed to reflect your opinions and prefer­
ences, based on your own clinical experience. 
I and my dissertation committee believe this study will yield valuable informa­
tion, both practically and theoretically. It has implications for the training 
of diagnosticians and the further development of formal diagnostic systems. 
Theoretically, it will help us understand person categorization in general, 
better. Ultimately, we believe our work will help to enhance the informational 
value of diagnosis, through the use of information from experienced clinicians 
like yourself. 
For your convenience in replying, I enclose a self-addressed, stamped postcard. 
Thank you for your consideration. 
Sincerely, 
cxod. tofru. 
'J.W. White, Ph.D. Ron Boykin, M.A. 
Graduate Student Associate Professor 
G R E E N S B O R O .  N O R T H  C  A  R  O  L  I  N  A  /  2 7 4  I  2 - 5 0 0  I  
THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA if compoud 0/ Ike s ixticn public in tor institutions ja North Carolina 
en «qud opportunity tmptoyer 
102 
APPENDIX B 
Complete Set of Materials for Subjects: Cover Letter, 
Instructions, Personality Profiles, and 
Attribute Listing Sheet 
THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA 
AT GREENSBORO 
Department of Psychology 
Thank you very much for agreeing to participate in my dissertation research 
project. This study is designed to take less than one hour of your time to 
complete, and may be completed away from your office if you prefer. 
This project is "being supervised by J. W. White, Ph. D., and has been en­
dorsed by our department's Human Subjects Review Committee. It meets all 
of the ethical guideline^ for research using human subjects, of the Amer­
ican Psychological Association. No discomfort or risk is involved, and 
there is no misinformation. Your participation will be kept strictly con­
fidential. Your responses in the study will be identified only by a 
special code number, thus assuring your anonymity. 
After all participants have returned their responses, you will receive a 
complete debriefing statement, informing you fully about the nature of the 
study. If you would like, I will also send you information about the re­
sults of the study as soon as they are available. 
If, at any time, you have any further questions regarding the procedures 
of this study, feel free to telephone me collect at (919) 33^-5013* Owe 
receptionist will not accept the charges; however, she will write down 
your name and leave a message in my mailbox. I will return your call as 
soon as I can. 
Please read, then sign and date the enclosed consent form before beginning 
the study. Complete the entire study uninterrupted if possible. Then 
return all materials except this letter in the self-addressed, stamped 
envelope (if at all possible, try to complete the study within one week of 
receiving it). 
This project will help us understand person categorization in general, and 
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INSTRUCTION 
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1. On the next page you will see a summary description of an individual. 
Please read the entire description; then think about an individual who 
would be described in that way. 
2. Below the description you will see a list of categories. Please decide 
which category you feel fits the description best. Place a checkmark 
beside that category in the blank space labelled "FIRST choice." 
3. After you have made your first choice of categories, please indicate 
how well you feel the person described fits into the category you have 
chosen, (individuals often vary in terms of how well they sure thought 
to exemplify categories. For example, an individual who fits a cate­
gory very well is referred to as a "classic" example of that category. 
On the other hand, an individual who fits a category very poorly is 
considered an "atypical" example of that category.) Circle one number 
from 1 through 7 beside the category name. High numbers indicate good 
fits between the person arid the category; low numbers indicate poor 
fits. 
U. After you have completed the steps above for the category you feel best 
fits the description, please indicate which category provides the next 
best fit. Place a checkmark beside that category in the blank labelled 
"SECOND choice." Then provide a typicality rating (goodness of fit) 
for that category. (The number you circle beside your second choice 
should not be a higher number than the one you circled beside your 
first choice.) 
5« Use the "Comments" section to clarify any choices you make which might 
be misunderstood (e. g., if you use one of the "Other" categories to 
specify a concept which does not directly refer to one or more specific 
personality styles). In your comments, please be as specific as you 
can concerning personality style(s) and typicality. 
6. When you have completed your choices for the first case, please turn 
the page to the next case. Complete the above steps for this, and each 
subsequent, case. 
POINTS TO REMEMBERi 
1. Assume that all of the individuals described are adults. Also assume 
that all of the attributes in each description are characteristic of 
the individual's current and long-term functioning; that they are in­
flexible and maladaptive; that they are not limited to episodes of ill­
ness; and that they cause either significant impairment in social or 
occupational functioning or subjective distress. 
2. Don't spend too much time on any one case. In a previous study similar 
to this one, clinicians spent a maximum of two minutes per case. Use 
this as a general guideline to complete the study in under one hour. 
Also, please do not return to a case once you have begun working on the 
next one. Complete all cases, in order. 
3. Please keep in mind that this is not a test of your clinical abilities; 
rather, it is a survey of your preferences, based on your own exper­
iences. We are interested in how you think about the individuals des­
cribed and categories of personality disorder. Therefore, we ask that 
you not consult any outside sources of information such as diagnostic 
manuals, texts, notes, or colleagues, in completing the study. 
THANK YOU AGAIN FOR PARTICIPATING IN THIS STUDY. PLEASE TURN THE PAGE AND 
BEGIN, 
105 
PLEASE THINK ABOUT AN INDIVIDUAL WHO IS DESCRIBED IN THE FOLLOWING WAYs 
(Antisocial, Shared, Central) 
This individual is egocentric. He or she flouts rules and conven­
tional authority. He or she is unreliable. He or she fails to learn 
from experience, and exhibits a self-defeating cycle of behaviors. 
He or she is selfish. He or she is manipulative. 
Please check (^) the appropriate blank space(s) to the left of the 
category or categories you choose. Circle one number to the right 
of each category you choose. Clarify any choices which might be mis­






CATEGORY TYPICALITY RATING (how well person 
described fits category chosen; 
7=best fit or "classic" example, 
l=poorest fit or most "atypical" 
example) 
Antisocial 7 6 5 4-321 
Borderline 7 6 5 b 3 2 1 
Histrionic 7 6 5 ^321 




WHEN YOU HAVE COMPLETED YOUR CHOICE FOR THIS CASE, PLEASE TURN THE PAGE. 
106 
PLEASE THINK ABOUT AN INDIVIDUAL WHO IS DESCRIBED IN THE FOLLOWING WAY: 
(Antisocial, Shared, Peripheral) 
This individual is haughty and arrogant. He or she is highly in­
dependent. He or she interprets minor slights as major insults. 
He or she is uncomfortable when alone for more than brief periods 
of time. The individual relies on him- or herself, rather than on 
the opinions of others, for self-esteem. He or she fears loss of 
self-determination. 
Please check (^) the appropriate blank space(s) to the left of the 
category or categories you choose. Circle one number to the right 
of each category you choose. Clarify any choices which might be mis­






CATEGORY TYPICALITY RATING (how well person 
described fits category chosen; 
7=best fit or "classic" example, 
l=poorest fit or most "atypical" 
example) 
Antisocial 7 6 5 ^32 1 
Borderline 7 6 5 ^32 1 
Histrionic 7 6 5 ^32 1 




WHEN YOU HAVE COMPLETED YOUR CHOICES FOR THIS CASE, PLEASE TURN THE PAGE. 
107 
PLEASE THINK ABOUT AN INDIVIDUAL WHO IS DESCRIBED IN THE FOLLOWING WAY: 
(Antisocial, Distinct, Central) 
This individual shows disregard for the consequences of his or 
her actions. He or she is irresponsible. He or she fails to accept 
and adopt social norms. He or she exhibits unlawful behavior. He 
or she lacks guilt. He or she shows disregard for the feelings of 
others. 
Please check (/) the appropriate blank space(s) to the left of the 
category or categories you choose. Circle one number to the right 
of each category you choose. Clarify any choices which Blight be mis­






CATEGORY TYPICALITY RATING (how well person 
described fits category chosen; 
7=best fit or "classic" example, 
l=poorest fit or most "atypical" 
example) 
Antisocial 7 6 5 b 3 2 1 
Borderline 7 6 5 ^32 1 
Histrionic 7 6 5 ^32 1 




WHEN YOU HAVE COMPLETED YOUR CHOICES FOR THIS CASE, PLEASE TURN THE PAGE. 
108 
PLEASE THINK ABOUT AN INDIVIDUAL WHO IS DESCRIBED IN THE FOLLOWING WAY: 
(Antisocial/ Distinct. Peripheral) 
This individual is vindictive. He or she lacks anxiety. He or 
she makes suicide attempts. The individual proudly displays his or 
her achievements. He or she exhibits pride in self-reliance and in­
dependence. He or she exhibits intense and persistent anger. 
Please check (^) the appropriate blank space(s) to the left of the 
category or categories you choose. Circle one number to the right 
of each category you choose. Clarify any choices which might be mis­






CATEGORY TYPICALITY RATING (how well person 
described fits category chosen; 
7=best fit or "classic" example, 
l=poorest fit or most "atypical" 
example) 
Antisocial 7 6 5 ^32 1 
Borderline 7 6 5 ^321 
Histrionic 7 6 5 ^ 3 2 1 




WHEN YOU HAVE COMPLETED YOUR CHOICES FOR THIS CASE, PLEASE TURN THE PAGE. 
109 
PLEASE THINK ABOUT AN INDIVIDUAL WHO IS DESCRIBED IN THE FOLLOWING WAY: 
(Antisocial, 50/50, All Central) 
The individual is egocentric. He or she fails to accept and adopt 
social norms. He or she is manipulative. He or she fails to learn 
from experience, and exhibits a self-defeating cycle of behaviors. 
He or she lacks guilt. He or she is irresponsible. 
Please check (^) the appropriate blank space(s) to the left of the 
category or categories you choose. Circle one number to the right 
of each category you choose. Clarify any choices which might be mis­






CATEGORY TYPICALITY RATING (how well person 
described fits category chosen; 
7=best fit or "classic" example, 
l=poorest fit or most "atypical" 
example) 
Antisocial 7 6 5 k 3 2 1 
Borderline 765^32 1 
Histrionic 765432 1 




WHEN YOU HAVE COMPLETED YOUR CHOICES FOR THIS CASE, PLEASE TURN THE PAGE. 
110 
PLEASE THINK ABOUT AN INDIVIDUAL WHO IS DESCRIBED IN THE FOLLOWING WAY: 
(Antisocial, 50/50, All Peripheral) 
This individual exhibits pride in self-reliance and independence. 
He or she is vindictive. The individual relies on him- or herself, 
rather than on the opinions of others, for self-esteem. He or she 
lacks anxiety. He or she is highly independent. He or she fears 
loss of self-determination. 
Please check (^) the appropriate blank space(s) to the left of the 
category or categories you choose. Circle one number to the right 
of each category you choose. Clarify any choices which might be mis­
understood (e. g., in the "Other" categories), in the "Comments" section, 
TYPICALITY RATING (how well person 
described fits category chosen; 
7=best fit or "classic" example, 
l=poorest fit or most "atypical" 
example) 
FIRST SECOND CATEGORY 
choice choice 
i r  l  v  
Antisocial ? 6 5 k J 2 1 
Borderline 7 6 5 ^32 1 
Histrionic 7 6 5 ^32 1 




WHEN YOU HAVE COMPLETED YOUR CHOICES FOR THIS CASE, PLEASE TURN THE PAGE. 
Ill 
PLEASE THINK ABOLTT AN INDIVIDUAL WHO IS DESCRIBED IN THE FOLLOWING WAY; 
(Antisocial, 50/50, Distinctives Central) 
This individual is haughty and arrogant. He or she exhibits un­
lawful behavior. He or she interprets minor slights as major insults. 
He or she is uncomfortable when alone for more than brief periods of 
time. This individual shows disregard for the consequences of his 
or her actions. He or she shows disregard for the feelings of oth­
ers. 
Please check (^) the appropriate blank space(s) to the left of the 
category or categories you choose. Circle one number to the right 
of each category you choose. Clarify any choices which might be mis­
understood (e. g., in the "Other" categories), in the "Comments" section. 
TYPICALITY RATING (how well person 
described fits category chosen; 
7=best fit or "classic" example, 
l=poorest fit or most "atypical" 
example) 
FIRST SECOND CATEGORY 
choice choice 
I I I 
Antisocial 7 6 5 ^321 
Borderline 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
Histrionic 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
Narcissistic 7 6 5 ^321 
Other (specify) 
7  6  5  ̂ 3 2 1  
Other (specify) 
7  6  5  ̂ 3 2 1  
C onunents (0 pti 0 nal): 
WHEN YOU HAVE COMPLETED YOUR CHOICES TOR THIS CASE, PLEASE TURN THE PAGE. 
112 
PLEASE THINK ABOUT AN INDIVIDUAL VfHO IS DESCRIBED IN THE FOLLOWING WAY: 
(Antisocial, 50/50, Shareds Central) 
This individual is selfish. He or she flouts rules and convention­
al authority. This individual proudly displays his or her achievements. 
He or she is unreliable. He or she makes suicide attempts. He or 
she displays intense and persistent anger. 
Please check (^) the appropriate blank space(s) to the left of the 
category or categories you choose. Circle one number to the right 
of each category you choose. Clarify any choices which might be mis­
understood (e. g., in the "Other" categories), in the "Comments" section. 
TYPICALITY RATING (how well person 
described fits category chosen; 
7=best fit or "classic" example, 
l=poorest fit or most "atypical" 
example) 
FIRST SECOND CATEGORY 
choice choice 
I I 
Antisocial 7 6 5 ^32 1 
Borderline 7 6 5 ^321 
Histrionic 7 6 5 ^32 1 
Narcissistic 7 6 5^32 1 
Other (specify) 
7  6  5  ̂ 3 2 1  
Other (specify) 
7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
Comments (optional): 
WHEN YOU HAVE COMPLETED YOUR CHOICES FOR THIS CASE, PLEASE TURN THE PAGE. 
113 
PLEASE THINK ABOOT AN INDIVIDUAL WHO IS DESCRIBED IN THE FOLLOWING WAY: 
(Borderline, Shared, Central) 
This individual shows a marked disturbance of self-identity, and 
confusion about his or her self-concept. He or she is impulsive. 
He or she is demanding. He or she displays intense, irrational, in­
appropriate anger. He or she shows impaired reality testing under 
stress. He or she is involved in unstable interpersonal relationships. 
Please check (^) the appropriate blank space(s) to the left of the 
category or categories you choose. Circle one number to the right 
of each category you choose. Clarify any choices which might be mis­
understood (e. g., in the "Other" categories), in the "Comments" section. 
TYPICALITY RATING (how well person 
described fits category chosen; 
7=best fit or "classic" example, 
l=poorest fit or most "atypical" 
example) 
FIRST SECOND CATEGORY 
choice choice 
I 1 
Antisocial 7 6 5 ^32 1 
Borderline 7 6 5 ^32 1 
Histrionic 7 6 5 ^321 
Narcissistic 7 6 5^32 1 
Other (specify) 
7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
Other (specify) 
7  6  5  ̂ 3 2  1  
Comments (optional) i 
WHEN YOU HAVE COMPLETED YOUR CHOICES FOR THIS CASE, PLEASE TURN THE PAGE. 
114 
PLEASE THINK ABOUT AN INDIVIDUAL WHO IS DESCRIBED IN THE FOLLOWING WAY; 
(Borderline, Shared, Peripheral) 
This individual is pessimistic. He or she is depressed. He or 
she is petulant and contrary. He or she is anhedonic, unable to ex­
perience pleasure. He or she is easily bored. This individual is 
self-effacing, and devalues his or her self-worth. 
Please check {>/) the appropriate blank space(s) to the left of the 
category or categories you choose. Circle one number to the right 
of each category you choose. Clarify any choices which might be mis­
understood (e. g., in the "Other" categories), in the "Comments" section. 
TYPICALITY RATING (how well person 
described fits category chosen; 
7=best fit or "classic" example, 
l=poorest fit or most "atypical" 
example) 
FIRST SECOND CATEGORY 
choice choice 
I 1 1 
Antisocial 7 6 5^321 
Borderline 7 6 5 ^321 
Histrionic 7 6 5^321 




WHEN YOU HAVE COMPLETED YOUR CHOICES FOR THIS CASE, PLEASE TURN THE PAGE. 
115 
PLEASE THINK ABOUT AN INDIVIDUAL WHO IS DESCRIBED IN THE FOLLOWING WAY; 
(Borderline, Distinct. Central) 
This individual is frequently overwhelmed by intense affect, either 
hostility or depression. This individual is unable to control his or 
her anger. He or she experiences mixed, conflicting feelings. This 
individual feels conflicting emotions of love, anger, and guilt to­
wards those upon whom he or she depends. He or she fears, and reacts 
strongly to, actual or imminent abandonment. He or she reacts intense­
ly to separation from others. 
Please check (•) the appropriate blank space(s) to the left of the 
category or categories you choose. Circle one number to the right 
of each category you choose. Clarify any choices which might be mis­






CATEGORY TYPICALITY RATING (how well person 
described fits category chosen; 
7=best fit or "classic" example, 
l=poorest fit or most "atypical" 
example) 
Antisocial 7 6 5 k 
Borderline 7 6 5 i* 
Histrionic 7 6 5 4 
















WHEN YOU HAVE COMPLETED YOUR CHOICES FOR THIS CASE, PLEASE TURN THE PAGE. 
116 
PLEASE THINK ABOUT AN INDIVIDUAL WHO IS DESCRIBED IN THE FOLLOWING WAY: 
(Borderline, Distinct, Peripheral) 
This individual's shame regarding dependency on others is expressed 
as hostility toward him- or herself. This individual is uncertain 
of his or her sexual identity. He or she feels guilty for past attempts 
at self-assertion and independence. He or she appears self-sacrificing 
to avoid separation from others. He or she rarely accepts responsib­
ilities. He or she exhibits irregular energy levels, which are un­
related to external events. 
Please check (^) the appropriate blank space(s) to the left of the 
category or categories you choose. Circle one number to the right 
of each category you choose. Clarify any choices which might be mis­






CATEGORY TYPICALITY RATING (how well person 
described fits category chosen; 
7=best fit or "classic" example, 
l=poorest fit or most "atypical" 
example) 
Antisocial ? 6 5 ^ 3 2 1 
Borderline 7 6 5 ^32 1 
Histrionic 7 6 5 ^32 1 
Narcissistic 7 6 5 ^32 1 
Other (specify) 
Other (specify) 
C omments (o pti onal)s 
WHEN YOU HAVE COMPLETED YOUR CHOICES FOR THIS CASE, PLEASE TURN THE PAGE. 
117 
PLEASE THINK ABOl/T AN INDIVIDUAL WHO IS DESCRIBED IN THE FOLLOWING WAY: 
(Borderline, 50/50, All Central) 
This individual experiences mixed, conflicting feelings. He or 
she is frequently overwhelmed by intense affect, either hostility 
or depression. He or she is impulsive. He or she reacts intensely 
to separation from others. He or she is involved in unstable inter­
personal relationships. He or she shows impaired reality testing 
under stress. 
Please check (S) the appropriate blank space(s) to the left of the 
category or categories you choose. Circle one number to the right 
of each category you choose. Clarify any choices which might be mis­






CATEGORY TYPICALITY RATING (how well person 
described fits category chosen; 
7=best fit or "classic" example, 
l=poorest fit or most "atypical" 
example) 
Antisocial 7 6 5 ^321 
Borderline 7 6 5 ^321 
Histrionic 7 6 5 ^321 




WHEN YOU HAVE COMPLETED YOUR CHOICES FOR THIS CASE, PLEASE TURN THE PAGE. 
118 
PLEASE THINK ABOUT AN INDIVIDUAL WHO IS DESCRIBED IN THE FOLLOWING WAY: 
(Borderline, 50/50, All Peripheral) 
This individual is depressed. He or she feels guilty for past 
attempts at self-assertion and independence. This individual is self-
effacing, and devalues his or her self-worth. He or she is petulant 
and contrary. This individual is uncertain of his or her sexual i-
dentity. This individual's shame regarding dependency on others is 
expressed as hostility toward him- or herself. 
Please check (^) the appropriate blank space(s) to the left of the 
category or categories you choose. Circle one number to the right 
of each category you choose. Clarify any choices which might be mis­






CATEGORY TYPICALITY RATING (how well person 
described fits category chosen; 
7=best fit or "classic" example, 
l=poorest fit or most "atypical" 
example) 
Antisocial 7 6 5 ^321 
Borderline 7 6 5 ^321 
Histrionic 7 6 5 ^321 




WHEN YOU HAVE COMPLETED YOUR CHOICES FOR THIS CASE, PLEASE TURN THE PAGE. 
119 
PLEASE THINK ABOUT AN INDIVIDUAL WHO IS DESCRIBED IN THE FOLLOWING WAY? 
(Borderline, 50/5Q.f Distinctives Central) 
This individual is pessimistic. This individual is unable to con­
trol his or her anger. He or she is easily bored. He or she is an-
hedonic, unable to experience pleasure. This individual feels conflicting 
emotions of love, anger, and guilt towards those upon whom he or she 
depends. He or she fears, and reacts strongly to, actual or imminent 
abandonment. 
Please check {>/) the appropriate blank space(s) to the left of the 
category or categories you choose. Circle one number to the right 
of each category you choose. Clarify any choices which might be mis­






CATEGORY TYPICALITY RATING (how well person 
described fits category chosen; 
7=best fit or "classic" example, 
l=poorest fit or most "atypical" 
example) 
Antisocial 7 6 5 ^32 1 
Borderline 7 6 5 ^32 1 
Histrionic 7 6 5 ^32 1 
Narcissistic 7 6 5 ^32 1 
Other (specify) 
Other (specify) 
C onunents (o pti onal): 
WHEN YOU HAVE COMPLETED YOUR CHOICES FOR THIS CASE, PLEASE TURN THE PAGE. 
120 
PLEASE THINK ABOUT AN INDIVIDUAL WHO IS DESCRIBED IN THE FOLLOWING WAYs 
(Borderline, 50/50, Shareds Central) 
This individual exhibits irregular energy levels, which are unre­
lated to external events. This individual shows a marked disturbance 
of self-identity, and confusion about his or her self-concept. He 
or she is demanding. He or she displays intense, irrational, inap­
propriate anger. He or she rarely accepts responsibilities. He or 
she appears self-sacrificing to avoid separation from others. 
Please check (/) the appropriate blank space(s) to the left of the 
category or categories you choose. Circle one number to the right 
of each category you choose. Clarify any choices which might be mis­






CATEGORY TYPICALITY RATING (how well person 
described fits category chosen; 
7=best fit or "classic" example, 
l=poorest fit or most "atypical" 
example) 
Antisocial 7 6 5 ^321 
Borderline 7 6 5 ^321 
Histrionic 7 6 5 b 3 2 1 




WHEN YOU HAVE COMPLETED YOUR CHOICES FOR THIS CASE, PLEASE TURN THE PAGE. 
121 
PLEASE THINK ABOUT AN INDIVIDUAL WHO IS DESCRIBED IN THE FOLLCWirc WAY: 
(Histrionic, Shared, Central) 
This individual is demanding. He or she is exhibitionistic. He 
or she becomes involved in shallow, frivolous, and fleeting relation­
ships. This individual incessantly draws attention to him- or herself, 
and is attention-seeking. He or she is emotionally shallow. He or 
she is manipulative. 
Please check (^) the appropriate blank space(s) to the left of the 
category or categories you choose. Circle one number to the right 
of each category you choose. Clarify any choices which might be mis­






CATEGORY TYPICALITY RATING (how well person 
described fits category chosen; 
7=best fit or "classic" example, 
l=poorest fit or most "atypical" 
example) 
Antisocial 7 6 5^321 
Borderline 7 6 5^321 
Histrionic 7 6 5 ^321 




WHEN YOU HAVE COMPLETED.YOUR CHOICES FOR THIS CASE, PLEASE TURN THE PAGE. 
122 
PLEASE THINK ABOUT AN INDIVIDUAL WHO IS DESCRIBED IN THE FOLLOWING WAY: 
(Histrionic, Shared, Peripheral) 
This individual shows impaired reality testing under stress. He 
or she is incapable of being loyal. He or she is submissive. He or 
she is stubborn and obstinate. His or her thoughts are superficial 
and fragmented. He or she exhibits extraordinary sensitivity to the 
thoughts and moods of others. 
Please check (V) the appropriate blank space(s) to the left of the 
category or categories you choose. Circle one number to the right 
of each category you choose. Clarify any choices which might be mis­
understood (e. g., in the "Other" categories), in the "Comments" section. 
TYPICALITY RATING (how well person 
described fits category chosen; 
?=best fit or "classic" example, 
l=poorest fit or most "atypical" 
example) 
FIRST SECOND CATEGORY 
choice choice 
i I I 
Antisocial ? 6 5 k 3 2 1 
Borderline 7 6 5 ^32 1 
Histrionic 765^32 1 
Narcissistic 7 6 5 ^32 1 
Other (specify) 
7  6  5  ̂ 3 2  1  
Other (specify) 
7  6  5  ̂ 3 2  1  
Comments (optional): 
WHEN YOU HAVE COMPLETED YOUR CHOICES FOR THIS CASE, PLEASE TURN THE PAGE. 
123 
PLEASE THINK ABOUT AN INDIVIDUAL WHO IS DESCRIBED IN THE FOLLOWING WAY: 
(Histrionic, Distinct, Central) 
This individual exhibits fleeting and superficial displays of af­
fection. He or she displays labile emotionality. He or she is over­
ly dramatic and theatrical. He or she is impressionable and suggestible. 
He or she interprets indifference as rejection. He or she is vain. 
Please check (/) the appropriate blank space(s) to the left of the 
category or categories you choose. Circle one number to the right 
of each category you choose. Clarify any choices which might be mis­
understood (e. g., in the "Other" categories), in the "Comments" section. 
TYPICALITY RATING (how well person 
described fits category chosen; 
7=best fit or "classic" example, 
l=poorest fit or most "atypical" 
example) 
FIRST SECOND CATEGORY 
choice choice 
i I 
Antisocial 7 6 5 ^321 
Borderline 7 6 5 ^321 
Histrionic 7 6 5 ^321 




WHEN YOU HAVE COMPLETED YOUR CHOICES FOR THIS CASE, PLEASE TURN THE PAGE. 
124 
PLEASE THINK ABOUT AN INDIVIDUAL WHO IS DESCRIBED IN THE FOLLOWING WAY: 
(Histrionic, Distinct, Peripheral) 
This individual rarely vents his or her hostility. He or she is 
excessively trusting. He or she is dissatisfied with single attach­
ments. He or she is creative and imaginative. He or she experienc­
es cyclical swings in mood, between euphoria and hopelessness. He or 
she experiences strong feelings of aggression. 
Please check (^) the appropriate blank space(s) to the left of the 
category or categories you choose. Circle one number to the right 
of each category you choose. Clarify any choices which might be mis­






CATEGORY TYPICALITY RATING (how well person 
described fits category chosen; 
7=best fit or "classic" example, 
l=poorest fit or most "atypical" 
example) 
Antisocial 7 6 5 k 3 2 1 
Borderline 765^32 1 
Histrionic 7 6 5 ^32 1 




WHEN YOU HAVE COMPLETED YOUR CHOICES FOR THIS CASE, PLEASE TURN THE PAGE. 
125 
PLEASE THINK ABOUT AN INDIVIDUAL WHO IS DESCRIBED IN THE FOLLOWING WAY: 
(Histrionic, 50/50, All Central) 
This individual displays labile emotionality. He or she is man­
ipulative. He or she exhibits fleeting and superficial displays of 
affection. This individual incessantly draws attention to him- or 
herself, and is attention-seeking. He or she is vain. He or she 
is emotionally shallow. 
Please check (^) the appropriate blank space(s) to the left of the 
category or categories you choose. Circle one number to the right 
of each category you choose. Clarify any choices which might be mis­






CATEGORY TYPICALITY RATING (how well person 
described fits category chosen; 
7=best fit or "classic" example, 
l=poorest fit or most "atypical" 
example) 
Antisocial 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
Borderline 765432 1 
Histrionic 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
Narcissistic 765432 1 
Other (specify) 
7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
Other (specify) 
7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
Comments (optional): 
WHEN YOU HAVE COMPLETED YOUR CHOICES TOR THIS CASE, PLEASE TURN THE PAGE. 
126 
PLEASE THINK ABOUT AN INDIVIDUAL VfHO IS DESCRIBED IN THE FOLLOWING WAY: 
(Histrionic, 50/50, All Peripheral) 
This individual is excessively trusting. He or she is stubborn 
and obstinate. He or she is incapable of being loyal. He or she 
experiences strong feelings of aggression. His or her thoughts are 
superficial and fragmented. He or she is dissatisfied with single 
attachments. 
Please check (\/) the appropriate blank space(s) to the left of the 
category or categories you choose. Circle one number to the right 
of each category you choose. Clarify any choices which might be mis­
understood (e. g., in the "Other" categories), in the "Comments" section. 
TYPICALITY RATING (how well person 
described fits category chosen; 
?=best fit or "classic" example, 








Antisocial 7 6 5 ^321 
Borderline 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
Histrionic 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 




WHEN YOU HAVE COMPLETED YOUR CHOICES FOR THIS CASE, PLEASE TURN THE PAGE. 
127 
PLEASE THINK ABOUT AN INDIVIDUAL WHO IS DESCRIBED IN THE FOLLOWING WAY: 
(Histrionic, 50/50, Distinctives Central) 
This individual interprets indifference as rejection. He or she 
is overly dramatic and theatrical. He or she is impressionable and 
suggestible. He or she displays extraordinary sensitivity to the 
thoughts and moods of others. He or she is submissive. He or she 
shows impaired reality testing under stress. 
Please check (y/) the appropriate blank space(s) to the left of the 
category or categories you choose. Circle one number to the right 
of each category you choose. Clarify any choices which might be mis­






CATEGORY TYPICALITY RATING (how well person 
described fits category chosen; 
7=best fit or "classic" example, 
l=poorest fit or most "atypical" 
example) 
Antisocial 7 6 5 ^321 
Borderline 7 6 5 ^321 
Histrionic 7 6 5 ^321 




WHEN YOU HAVE COMPLETED YOUR CHOICES FOR THIS CASE, PLEASE TURN THE PAGE. 
128 
PLEASE THINK ABOUT AN INDIVIDUAL WHO IS DESCRIBED IN THE FOLLOWING WAY: 
(Histrionic, 50/50, Shareds Central) 
This individual is exhibitionistic. He or she experiences cycli­
cal swings in mood, between euphoria and hopelessness. He or she is 
demanding. This individual rarely vents his or her hostility. He 
or she becomes involved in shallow, frivolous, and fleeting relation­
ships. He or she is creative and imaginative. 
Please check (•) the appropriate blank space(s) to the left of the 
category or categories you choose. Circle one number to the right 
of each category you choose. Clarify any choices which might be mis­
understood (e. g., in the "Other" categories), in the "Comments" section. 
TYPICALITY RATING (how well person 
described fits category chosen; 
7=best fit or "classic" example, 
l=poorest fit or most "atypical" 
example) 
FIRST SECOND CATEGORY 
choice choice 
1 1 
Antisocial 765432 1 
Borderline 765432 1 
Histrionic 765432 1 
Narcissistic 765432 1 
Other (specify) 
7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
Other (specify) 
7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
Comments (optional): 
WHEN YOU HAVE COMPLETED YOUR CHOICES FOR THIS CASE, PLEASE TURN THE PAGE. 
129 
PLEASE THINK ABOUT AN INDIVIDUAL WHO IS DESCRIBED IN THE FOLLOWING WAY: 
(Narcissistic, Shared, Central) 
This individual wants constant attention and admiration. He or 
she lacks empathy. He or she is hypersensitive to real or imagined 
criticism. He or she has a grandiose sense of self-importance. He 
or she is selfish. He or she is egocentric. 
Please check (^) the appropriate blank space(s) to the left of the 
category or categories you choose. Circle one number to the right 
of each category you choose. Clarify any choices which might be mis­






CATEGORY TYPICALITY RATING (how well person 
described fits category chosen; 
7=best fit or "classic" example, 
l=poorest fit or most "atypical" 
example) 
Antisocial 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
Borderline 7 6 5 ^32 1 
Histrionic 765^32 1 
Narcissistic 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
Other (specify) 
7  6  5  ̂ 3 2  1  
Other (specify) 
7  6  5  ̂ 3 2  1  
Comments (optional): 
WHEN YOU HAVE COMPLETED YOUR CHOICE FOR THIS CASE, PLEASE TURN THE PAGE. 
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PLEASE THINK ABOOT AN INDIVIDUAL WHO IS DESCRIBED IN THE FOLLOWIJG WAY: 
(Narcissistic, Shared, Peripheral) 
This individual is prone to brief psychotic episodes during per­
iods of extreme stress. He or she is highly independent. He or she 
is depressed. This individual relies on him- or herself for secur­
ity and contentment. He or she is self-conscious. He or she is en­
ergetic . 
Please check (^) the appropriate blank space(s) to the left of the 
category or categories you choose. Circle one number to the right 
of each category you choose. Clarify any choices which might be mis­






CATEGORY TYPICALITY RATING (how Hell person 
described fits category chosen; 
?=best fit or "classic" example, 
l=poorest fit or most "atypical" 
example) 
Antisocial 7 6 5 ^ 3 2 1 
Borderline 7 6 5 ^321 
Histrionic 7 6 5 ^321 




WHEN YOU HAVE COMPLETES). YOUR CHOICES FOR THIS CASE, PLEASE TURN THE PAGE. 
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PLEASE THINK ABOUT AN INDIVIDUAL WHO IS DESCRIBED IN THE FOLLOWING WAY: 
(Narcissistic, Distinct, Central) 
This individual's relations with others lack sustained positive 
regard. This individual is preoccupied with how well he or she is 
regarded by others. He or she has fragile self-esteem. He or she 
exhibits entitlement, expects special favors, and believes that he 
or she is entitled to unusual rights and privileges. He or she ex­
periences feelings of rage in response to criticism, defeat, or the 
indifference of others, and has a tendency to rage. He or she is 
concerned with grooming and appearance. 
Please check (^) the appropriate blank space(s) to the left of the 
category or categories you choose. Circle one number to the right 
of each category you choose. Clarify any choices which might be mis­
understood (e. g., in the "Other" categories), in the "Comments" section. 
TYPICALITY RATING (how well person 
described fits category chosen; 
?=best fit or "classic" example, 
l=poorest fit or most "atypical" 
example) 
FIRST SECOND CATEGORY 
choice choice 
1 I I 
Antisocial 765432 1 
Borderline 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
Histrionic 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 




WHEN YOU HAVE COMPLETED YOUR CHOICES FOR THIS CASE, PLEASE TURN THE PAGE. 
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PLEASE THINK ABOLTT AN INDIVIDUAL WHO IS DESCRIBED IN THE FOLLOWING WAY: 
(Narcissistic, Distinct, Peripheral) 
This individual pursues goals with a "driven", pleasureless quali­
ty. He or she exhibits an air of nonchalance and imperturbability, 
and is confident that matters will work out. He or she is calm and 
self-assured. He or she readily assumes the role of leader. He or 
she experiences feelings of unreality. He or she is optimistic. 
Please check (^) the appropriate blank space(s) to the left of the 
category or categories you choose. Circle one number to the right 
of each category you choose. Clarify any choices which might be mis­
understood (e. g., in the "Other" categories), in the "Comments" section. 
TYPICALITY RATING (how well person 
described fits category chosen; 
7=best fit or "classic" example, 
l=poorest fit or most "atypical" 
example) 
FIRST SECOND CATEGORY 
choice choice 
i I 
Antisocial 7 6 5^32 1 
Borderline 7^5^32 1 
Histrionic 7 6 5 ^ 3 2 1 




WHEN YOU HAVE COMPLETED YOUR CHOICES FOR THIS CASE, PLEASE TURN THE PAGE. 
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PLEASE THINK ABOLTT AN INDIVIDUAL MHO IS DESCRIBED IN THE FOLLOWING WAY: 
(Narcissistic, 50/50, All Central) 
This individual exhibits entitlement, expects special favors, and 
believes that he or she is entitled to unusual rights and privileges. 
He or she is selfish. He or she lacks empathy. His or her relations 
with others lack sustained positive regard. This individual is pre­
occupied with how well he or she is regarded by others. He or she 
is egocentric. 
Please check (/) the appropriate blank space(s) to the left of the 
category or categories you choose. Circle one number to the right 
of each category you choose. Clarify any choices which might be mis­
understood (e. g., in the "Other" categories), in the "Comments" section. 
TYPICALITY RATING (how well person 
described fits category chosen; 
7=best fit or "classic" example, 
l=poorest fit or most "atypical" 
example) 
FIRST SECOND CATEGORY 
choice choice 
I I 
Antisocial 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
Borderline 7 6 5 ^321 
Histrionic ? 6 3 k J 2 1 
Narcissistic 7 6 5 k 3 2 1 
Other (specify) 
7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
Other (specify) 
7  6  5  ̂ 3 2 1  
Comments (optional): 
WHEN YOU HAVE COMPLETED YOUR CHOICES FOR THIS CASE, PLEASE TURN THE PAGE. 
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PLEASE THINK ABOUT AN INDIVIDUAL WHO IS DESCRIBED IN THE FOLLOWING WAY: 
(Narcissistic, 50/50, All Peripheral) 
This individual relies on him- or herself for security and content­
ment. He or she pursues goals with a "driven," pleasureless quality. 
He or she is depressed. He or she readily assumes the role of lead­
er. He or she is calm and self-assured. He or she is energetic. 
Please check (^) the appropriate blank space(s) to the left of the 
category or categories you choose. Circle one number to the right 
of each category you choose. Clarify any choices which might be mis­
understood (e. g., in the "Other" categories), in the "Comments" section. 
TYPICALITY RATING (how well person 
described fits category chosen; 
7=best fit or "classic" example, 
l=poorest fit or most "atypical" 
example) 
FIRST SECOND CATEGORY 
choice choice 
i i 
Antisocial 7 6 5 ^32 1 
Borderline 7 6 5 ^32 1 
Histrionic 7 6 5 ^32 1 




WHEN YOU HAVE COMPLETED YOUR CHOICES FOR THIS CASE, PLEASE TURN THE PAGE. 
1.35 
PLEASE THINK ABOUT AN INDIVIDUAL WHO IS DESCRIBED IN THE FOLLOWING WAY: 
(Narcissistic, 50/50, Distinctives Central) 
This individual experiences feelings of rage in response to crit­
icism, defeat, or the indifference of others, and has a tendency to 
rage. He or she has fragile self-esteem. He or she is concerned 
with grooming and appearance. He or she is highly independent. He 
or she is prone to brief psychotic episodes during periods of extreme 
stress. He or she is self-conscious. 
Please check (^) the appropriate blank space(s) to the left of the 
category or categories you choose. Circle one number to the right 
of each category you choose. Clarify any choices which might be mis­
understood (e. g., in the "Other" categories), in the "Comments" section. 
TYPICALITY RATING (how well person 
described fits category chosen; 
7=best fit or "classic" example, 
l=poorest fit or most "atypical" 
example) 
FIRST SECOND CATEGORY 
choice choice 
l l v 
Antisocial 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
Borderline 7 6 5 ^321 
Histrionic 7 6 5 ^321 
Narcissistic 7 6 5 ^321 
Other (specify) 
7  6  5  ̂ 3 2 1  
Other (specify) 
7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
Comments (optional): 
WHEN YOU HAVE COMPLETED YOUR CHOICES FOR THIS CASE, PLEASE TURN THE PAGE. 
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PLEASE THINK ABOITT AN INDIVIDUAL WHO IS DESCRIBED IN THE FOLLOW I MS WAY: 
(Narcissistic, 50/50, Shareds Central) 
This individual is hypersensitive to real or imagined criticism. 
He or she experiences feelings of unreality. He or she wants constant 
attention and admiration. He or she is optimistic. He or she has 
a grandiose sense of self-importance. He or she displays an air of 
nonchalance and imperturbability and confidence that matters will 
work out. 
Please check (^) the appropriate blank space(s) to the left of the 
category or categories you choose. Circle one number to the right 
of each category you choose. Clarify any choices which might be mis­
understood (e. g.f in the "Other" categories), in the "Comments" section. 
TYPICALITY RATING (how well person 
described fits category chosen; 
7=best fit or "classic" example, 
l=poorest fit or most "atypical" 
example) 
FIRST SECOND CATEGORY 
choice choice 
I I I 
Antisocial 7 6 5 ^32 1 
Borderline 7 6 5 ^32 1 
Histrionic 7 6 5 ^32 1 




WHEN YOU HAVE COMPLETED YOUR CHOICES FOR THIS CASE, PLEASE TURN THE PAGE. 
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REFER BACK TO THE LAST DESCRIPTION IN THE STUDY, WHICH YOU JUST COMPLETED, 
IN ORDER TO ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTION: 
Which attribute(s) in the description were important to you in making your 
first choice of categories? Please list the attribute(s) in the blank(s) 
below. If you list more than one attribute, please list them in order of 
their importance to you, beginning with the most important attribute. 
Then circle one number from 1 through 5 beside each attribute you list, 
to indicate how important that attribute was to you in making your first 
choice of categories (high numbers indicate a great deal of importance, 
while low numbers indicate mild importance). 








5 if 3 2 
THANK YOU FOR PARTICIPATING IN THE STUDY. PLEASE PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING 
INFORMATION ABOUT YOURSELFi 
Age i 
Primary setting in which you practice (circle one)» Private practice 
Community mental health center Hospital University 
Other (specify) 
Degreei Ph. D. Ed. D. Year received: 
Year first licensed as Practicing Psychologist (any state), approximate: 
Number of years of clinical experience involving diagnosing personality 
disorders, approximate: 




Average Attribute Prototypicality by Diagnosis, 
For Levels of Independent Variables 
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Average Attribute Prototypicality by Diagnosis, 
For Levels of Independent Variables 
DISTINCTIVE SHARED 
HIGH ==> 6.05 5.94 
BORDERLINE Prototypicality 
LOW ==> 4.21 4.15 
HIGH ==> 5.84 5.82 
NARCISSISTIC Prototypicality 
LOW ==> 3.54 3.53 
HIGH ==> 6.00 6.02 
ANTISOCIAL Prototypicality 
LOW ==> 3.89 3.91 
HIGH ==> 5.72 5.58 
HISTRIONIC Prototypicality 
LOW ==> 3.63 3.71 
